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ABSTRACT
This thesis offers a contribution to the study of Social Learning and Networks. It
studies information aggregation and its effect on individual’s actions (Chapter 2, 3)
and social network (Chapter 4).
Chapter 2, co-authored with Omer Tamuz and Wade Hann-Caruthers, studies how
quickly does the public belief converge to its true value when agents are able
to observe actions of their predecessors. In the classical herding literature, agents
receive a private signal regarding a binary state of nature, and sequentially choose an
action, after observing the actions of their predecessors. When the informativeness
of private signals is unbounded, it is known that agents converge to the correct
action and correct belief. We study how quickly convergence occurs, and show that
it happens more slowly than it does when agents observe signals. However, we also
show that the speed of learning from actions can be arbitrarily close to the speed of
learning from signals. In particular, the expected time until the agents stop taking
the wrong action can be either finite or infinite, depending on the private signal
distribution. In the canonical case of Gaussian private signals, we calculate the
speed of convergence precisely, and show explicitly that, in this case, learning from
actions is significantly slower than learning from signals.
In Chapter 3, I investigate how social planning can reduce the inefficiencies of social
learning, stemming from herding and informational cascades. A social planner
is introduced to the classical sequential social learning model. She can tax or
subsidize players’ actions in order to maximize social welfare, a discounted sum
of agents’ utilities. We solve or accurately approximate the expected utility of
the social planner and the optimal pricing strategy for various signal distributions.
In equilibrium, it is optimal to increase the price for the better action, causing a
reduction in current agent’s utility, but also a net gain, due to the information this
action reveals. The addition of the social planner significantly improves social
welfare and the asymptotic speed of learning.
Chapter 4 analyzes how different types of social connections between people shape
their social networks. There are two possible types of ties between individuals,
strong and weak, that differ in maintenance costs and reliability. A network for-
mation game is played in which agents choose the number of ties of each type to
maximize their chances of hearing about a new job opportunity. We find that in
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equilibrium, people maintain both types of connections, which was not explained
in previous theoretical models. Furthermore, in the socially optimal symmetric
network, there are more strong ties than in the equilibrium one.
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C h a p t e r 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis studies information aggregation and its effects on individuals’ actions
(Chapter 2, 3) and social network (Chapter 4). Chapters 2 and 3 analyze the speed
of asymptotic social learning and how this process can be made more efficient from
society’s perspective. In Chapter 4, I analyze how information aggregation affects
individuals’ choices for different types of connections between people in their social
network and rationalize why there is more than one type of links in the real-world
networks.
In Chapter 2, with Omer Tamuz and Wade Hann-Caruthers, we consider a well-
known model of sequential social learning introduced separately by Bihchandani,
Hirshleifer, Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992). In this study we calculate precisely
the asymptotic speed of convergence of the log-likelihood belief to its true value
(+∞ or −∞) when the strength of private signals is unbounded1. In doing so, we
develop a novel technique that allows to approximate with a very high precision a
highly non-linear recurrence equation. Furthermore, we solve the following open
problem: is the expected time until people start taking the correct action finite or
infinite? As it turns out, it depends on the distributions of individuals’ private
signals. We provide examples for both cases. Finally, we compare the learning
speed to the one that we obtain when agents can observe not only actions of their
predecessors, but also their actual signals. We show that in the latter case it is linear
whereas in the former one it is always sublinear. Additionally, we can find a pair
of signal distributions, one for each state of the world, such that the log-likelihood
grows at a rate arbitrarily close to linear.
Chapter 3, which stems from the second one, studies how the aforementioned social
learning mechanism can be made socially efficient. A problem arises when the log-
likelihood ratio becomes very large in its absolute value. When this happens, we are
unable to extract a lot of information about the private signal from the action that
was taken, as we already anticipate the next person to follow the trend, given such
a high prior belief. In order to solve this problem, I introduce a social planner who
1If their strength is bounded, then the log-likelihood is also bounded and cannot converge to its
true value.
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observes the sequence of actions taken by individuals. Based on its realization, she
can set a price (positive or negative) for taking one of the actions2. This innovation
does not change the ability to learn: if in the initial setup learning occurs (does
not occur) with probability 1, then it also occurs (does not occur) under the new
proposed mechanism. However, it does dramatically increase the social welfare and
the accuracy of the final belief. In the case of bounded (binary) signals, I present
a complete solution for the expected utility function and the pricing mechanism,
which depends on the current sequence of actions. In the unbounded case, I prove
that the general description of the social planner’s strategy stays the same as in the
binary case: she always sets a positive price for the better action (the one with
higher likelihood belief). Furthermore, I present various numerical calculations of
the optimal pricing strategy and the corresponding expected utility as a function of
the public belief. Surprisingly, the new mechanism does not only increase the social
welfare but also greatly improves (by more than 57%) the asymptotic learning speed
as we get to extract more information from each individual action.
In Chapter 4, I investigate the underlying economic reason for why we observe
different types of social connections between individuals in real life (strong and
weak). In standard network models, if agents, who are facing a budget constraint,
have a choice between different types of connections, theywould choose the one type
that maximizes their direct utility and completely disregard the rest of them. This
raises the following question: is there an economic rationale for observing different
types of ties between individuals in real life or is it just due to human psychological
nature and there is no reason for economists to model them separately? To answer
this question, I introduce a newmodel of network formation in which the underlying
graph can have different clustering coefficients for various types of connections.
This property of the model conforms with empirical data and provides a better
intuition for the underlying process.
To elaborate more on this topic, imagine that there are two possible types of connec-
tions between individuals: strong – reliable and expensive, and weak – less reliable
and cheap. This chapter makes two main contributions to the field. First, I give
an economic explanation for why people do not choose only one type of ties by
studying an equilibrium of this game. One of the largest shares of the agents’ utility
come from a group of people who are either weakly connected to some of her strong
ties or who are strongly connected to some of her weak ties (so-called weak-strong
2This is equivalent to being able to set prices for both of them.
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or strong-weak ties). To have a positive number of people in this group (weak-strong
or strong-weak), there have to be both weak and strong types of connections present
in the network.
Second, I compare this equilibrium network with a symmetric socially optimal one.
I find that these two networks are very similar which means that agents are able to
achieve an almost optimal outcome on their own. However, in the latter one agents
have more strong ties. Intuitively, it happens because in the socially optimal case,
people care not only about getting the signal, but also about sharing it with others,
and the strong connections are more reliable sources of information.
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C h a p t e r 2
ASYMPTOTIC SPEED OF SOCIAL LEARNING
2.1 Introduction
When making decisions, we often rely on the decisions that others before us have
made. Sequential learning models have been used to understand different phenom-
ena that occur when many individuals make decisions based on the observed actions
of others. These include herd behavior (cf. (Banerjee, 1992)), where many agents
make the same choice, as well as informational cascades (e.g. (Bikhchandani, Hir-
shleifer, and Welch, 1992)), where the actions of the first few agents provide such
compelling evidence that later agents no longer have incentive to consider their own
private information.
Such results on how information aggregation can fail are complemented by results
which demonstrate that when private signals are arbitrarily strong, learning is robust
to this kind of collapse (L. Smith and Sørensen, 2000). In particular, in a process
called asymptotic learning (see, e.g., (Acemoglu et al., 2011)), agents will eventually
choose the correct action and their beliefs will converge to the truth. Two questions
that has not been answered in the literature is: how quickly does this happen? And
how does the speed of learning compare to a setting in which agents observe signals
rather than actions?
We consider the classical setting of a binary state of nature and binary actions, where
each of the two actions is optimal at one of the states. The agents receive private
signals that are independent conditioned on the state. These signals are unbounded,
in the sense that an agent’s posterior belief regarding the state can be arbitrarily
close to both 0 and 1. The agents are exogenously ordered, and, at each time period,
a single agent takes an action, after observing the actions of her predecessors.
We measure the speed of learning by studying how the public belief evolves as more
and more agents act. Consider an outside observer who observes the actions of the
sequence of agents. The public belief is the posterior belief that such an outside
observer assigns to the correct state of nature. It provides a measure of how well
the population has learned the state. Since signals are unbounded, the public belief
tends to 1 over time (L. Smith and Sørensen, 2000); equivalently, the corresponding
log-likelihood ratio tends to infinity. As the outside observer may also be interested
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in learning the state, it is natural to ask how quickly she converges to the correct
belief, and, in particular, to understand her asymptotic speed of learning when
observing actions. Asymptotic rates of convergence are an important tool in the
study of inference processes in statistical theory, and have also been studied in social
learning models in the Economics literature (e.g., (Vives, 1993; Duffie and Manso,
2007; Duffie, Malamud, and Manso, 2009)).
When agents observe the signals (rather than actions) of all of their predecessors,
this log-likelihood ratio is asymptotically linear. Thus, it cannot grow faster than
linearly when the agents observe actions. Our first main finding is that when
observing actions, the log-likelihood ratio always grows sub-linearly. Equivalently,
the public belief converges sub-exponentially to 1. Our second main finding is that,
depending on the choice of private signal distributions, the log-likelihood ratio can
grow at a rate that is arbitrarily close to linear.
We next analyze the specific canonical case of Gaussian private signals. Here, we
calculate precisely the asymptotic behavior of the log-likelihood ratio of the public
belief. We show that learning from actions is significantly slower than learning from
signals: the log-likelihood ratio behaves asymptotically as
√
log C. To calculate this,
we develop a technique that allows, muchmore generally, for the long-term evolution
of the public belief to be calculated for a large class of signal distributions.
Since, in our setting of unbounded signals, agents eventually take the correct action,
an additional, natural measure of the speed of learning is the expected time at which
this happens: how long does it take until no more mistakes are made? We call this
the time to learn.
We show that the expected time to learn depends crucially on the signal distributions.
For distributions, such as the Gaussian, in which strong signals occur with very small
probability, we show that the expected time to learn is infinite.1 However, when
strong signals are less rare, this expectation is finite.2 Intuitively, when strong
signals are rare, agents are more likely to emulate their predecessors, and so it may
take a long time for a mistake to be corrected.
Finally, in the Gaussian case, we study another measure of the speed of learning.
Namely, we consider directly how the probability of choosing the incorrect action
varies as agents see more and more of the other agents’ decisions before making
1In the benchmark case of observed signals this time is finite, for any signal distribution.
2This result disproves a conjecture of Sørensen (Sørensen, 1996, page 36).
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their own. We find that this probability is asymptotically no less than 1/C1+Y for any
Y > 0. In contrast, when agents can observe the private signals of their predecessors,
the probability of mistake decays exponentially, and so, also in this sense, learning
from signals is much faster than learning from actions.
Related literature
Several previous studies have considered the same question. Chamley (Chamley,
2004) gives an estimate for the evolution of the public belief for a class of private
signal distributions with fat tails. He also studies the speed of convergence in the
Gaussian case using a computer simulation. Sørensen (Sørensen, 1996, Lemma
1.9) has published a claim related to our Theorem 1, with an unfinished proof. Also
in (Sørensen, 1996), Sørensen shows that the expected time to learn is infinite for
some signal distributions, and conjectures that it is always infinite, which we show
to not be true. In (L. Smith and Sørensen, 1996), an early version of (L. Smith and
Sørensen, 2000), the question of the time to learn is also addressed, and an example
is given in which the time to learn is infinite, but is finite conditioned on one of the
states. A concurrent paper by Rosenberg and Vieille (Rosenberg and Vieille, 2017)
studies related questions. In particular, they study the time until the first correct
action, as well as the number of incorrect actions—which are related to our time to
learn—,and characterize when they have finite expectations.
A related model is studied by Lobel, Acemoglu, Dahleh and Ozdaglar (Lobel et al.,
2009), who consider agents who also act sequentially, but do not observe all of their
predecessors’ actions. They study how the speed of learning varies with the network
structure. Vives (Vives, 1993), in a paper with a very similar spirit to ours, studies
the speed of sequential learning in a model with actions chosen from a continuum,
and where agents observe a noisy signal about their predecessors’ actions. He
similarly shows that learning is significantly slower than in the benchmark case. An
overview of this literature is given by Vives in his book (Vives, 2010, Chapter 6).
2.2 Model
Let \ ∈ {−1, +1} be the true state of theworld, with each state a priori equally likely3.
Each rational agent C ∈ {1, 2, . . .} receives a private signal BC . The signals are i.i.d.
conditioned on \: if \ = +1, they have cumulative distribution function (CDF)
3We make this simplification of a (1/2,1/2) prior to reduce the complexity of the presentation,
but all results hold for general priors.
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+ and if \ = −1, they have CDF −.4 We assume that + and − are absolutely
continuous with respect to each other, so that private signals never completely reveal
the state.
Let
!C = log
P(\ = +1|BC)
P(\ = −1|BC)
be the log-likelihood ratio of the belief induced by the agent’s private signal. We
assume that private signals are unbounded, in the sense that !C is unbounded: for
every " ∈ R, the probability that !C > " is positive, as is the probability that
!C < −" . We denote by + and − the conditional CDFs of !C .
The agents act sequentially, with agent C acting after observing the actions of agents
{1, . . . , C − 1}. The utility of the action 0C ∈ {−1, +1} is 1 if 0C = \ and 0 otherwise.
Denote the public belief by
`C = P(\ = +1|01, . . . , 0C−1).
This is the posterior held by an outside observer after recording the actions of the
first C − 1 agents. We denote by ℓC the log-likelihood ratio of the public belief:
ℓC = log
`C
1 − `C
·
In equilibrium, agent C chooses 0C = +1 iff5
log
P(\ = +1|01, . . . , 0C−1, BC)
P(\ = −1|01, . . . , 0C−1, BC)
> 0.
A simple calculation shows that this occurs iff
ℓC + !C > 0.
Now, another straightforward calculation shows that when 0C = +1,
ℓC+1 = ℓC + +(ℓC), (2.1)
where
+(G) = log
1 − +(−G)
1 − −(−G)
·
4One could consider signals that take values in a general measurable space (rather than R),
but the choice of R is in fact without loss of generality, since all standard measurable spaces are
isomorphic.
5For simplicity, we assume that agents choose action −1 when indifferent. This will have no
impact on our results.
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Likewise, when 0C = −1,
ℓC+1 = ℓC + −(ℓC),
where
−(G) = log
+(−G)
−(−G)
·
We can interpret +(ℓC) and −(ℓC) as the contributions of agent C’s action to the
public belief.
2.3 The evolution of public belief
Consider a baseline model, in which each agent observes the private signals of all
of her predecessors. In this case, the public log-likelihood ratio ℓ̃C would equal the
sum
ℓ̃C =
C∑
g=1
!g .
Conditioned on the state, this is the sum of i.i.d. random variables, and so by the
law of large numbers we have that the limit limC ℓ̃C/C would—conditioned on (say)
\ = +1—equal the conditional expectation of !C , which is positive.6
Sub-linear public beliefs
Our first main result shows that when agents observe actions rather than signals,
the public log-likelihood ratio grows sub-linearly, and so learning from actions is
always slower than learning from signals.
Theorem 1. It holds with probability 1 that limC ℓC/C = 0.
Our second main result shows that, depending on the choice of private signal
distributions, ℓC can grow at a rate that is arbitrarily close to linear: given any sub-
linear function AC , it is possible to find private signal distributions so that ℓC grows
as fast as AC .
Theorem 2. For any A : N → R>0, such that limC AC/C = 0 there exists a choice of
CDFs − and + such that
lim inf
C→∞
|ℓC |
AC
> 0
with probability 1.
6In fact, E(!C |\ = +1) is equal to the Kullback-Leibler divergence between + and −, which is
positive as long as the two distributions are different.
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For example, for some choice of private signal distributions, ℓC grows asymptotically
at least as fast as C/log C, which is sub-linear but (perhaps) close to linear.
Long-term behavior of public beliefs
We next turn to estimating more precisely the long-term behavior of the public
log-likelihood ratio ℓC . Since signals are unbounded, agents learn the state, so that
ℓC tends to +∞ if \ = +1, and to −∞ if \ = −1. In particular ℓC stops changing sign
from some C on with probability 1; all later agents choose the correct action.
We consider without loss of generality the case that \ = +1, so that ℓC is positive
from some C on. Thus, recalling (2.1), we have that from some C on,
ℓC+1 = ℓC + +(ℓC).
This is the recurrence relation that we need to solve in order to understand the
long term evolution of ℓC . To this end, we consider the corresponding differential
equation:
d 5
dC
(C) = +( 5 (C)).
Recall that − is the CDF of the private log-likelihood ratio !C , conditioned on
\ = −1. We show (Lemma 27) that +(G) is well approximated by−(−G) for high
G, in the sense that
lim
G→∞
+(G)
−(−G)
= 1.
In some applications (including the Gaussian one, which we consider below), the
expression for − is simpler than that for +, and so one can instead consider the
differential equation
d 5
dC
(C) = −(− 5 (C)). (2.2)
This equation can be solved analytically in many cases in which − has a simple
form. For example, if −(−G) = e−G , then 5 (C) = log(C + 2), and if −(−G) = G−:
then 5 (C) = ((: + 1) · C + 2)1/(:+1) .
We show that solutions to this equation have the same long term behavior as ℓC ,
given that − satisfies some regularity conditions.
Theorem 3. Suppose that − and + are continuous, and that the left tail of − is
convex and differentiable. Suppose also that 5 : R>0 → R>0 satisfies
d 5
dC
(C) = −(− 5 (C)) (2.3)
10
for all sufficiently large C. Then conditional on \ = +1,
lim
C→∞
ℓC
5 (C) = 1
with probability 1.
The condition7 on − is satisfied when the random variables !C (i.e., the log-
likelihood ratios associated with the private signals), conditioned on \ = −1, have a
distribution with a probability density function that is monotone decreasing for all
G less than some G0. This is the case for the normal distribution and for practically
every non-atomic distribution one may encounter in the standard probability and
statistics literatures.
Gaussian signals
In the Gaussian case, + is Normal with mean +1 and variance f2, and − is Normal
with mean −1 and the same variance. A simple calculation shows that − is the
Gaussian cumulative distribution function, and so we cannot solve the differential
equation (2.2) analytically. However, we can bound −(G) from above and from
below by functions of the form e−2·G2/G. For these functions, the solution to (2.2) is
of the form 5 (C) =
√
log C, and so we can use Theorem 3 to deduce the following.
Theorem 4. When private signals are Gaussian, then conditioned on \ = +1,
lim
C→∞
ℓC
(2
√
2/f) ·
√
log C
= 1
with probability 1.
Recall, that when private signals are observed, the public log-likelihood ratio ℓC is
asymptotically linear. Thus, learning from actions is far slower than learning from
signals in the Gaussian case.
The expected time to learn
When private signals are unbounded, then with probability 1 the agents eventually
all choose the correct action 0C = \. A natural question is: how long does it take for
that to happen? Formally, we define the time to learn
)! = min{C : 0g = \ for all g ≥ C},
7By “the left tail of − is convex and differentiable”, we mean that there is some G0 such that,
restricted to (−∞, G0), − is convex and differentiable.
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and study its expectation. Note that in the baseline case of observed signals )! has
finite expectation, since the probability of a mistake at time C decays exponentially
with C.
We first study the expectation of )! in the case of Gaussian signals. To this end, we
define the time of first mistake by
)1 = min{C : 0C ≠ \}
if 0C ≠ \ for some C, and by )1 = 0 otherwise. We calculate a lower bound for the
distribution of )1, showing that it decays at most as fast as 1/C.
Theorem 5. When private signals are Gaussian, then for every Y > 0 there exists a
: > 0 such that for all C
P()1 = C) ≥
:
C1+Y
·
Thus )1 has a very thick tail, decaying far slower than the exponential decay of the
baseline case. In particular, )1 has infinite expectation, and so, since )! > )1, the
expectation of the time to learn )! is also infinite.
In contrast, we show that when private signals have thick tails—that is, when the
probability of a strong signal vanishes slowly enough—, then the time to learn has
finite expectation. In particular, we show this when the left tail of − and the right
tail of + are polynomial.8
Theorem 6. Assume that −(−G) = 2 · G−: and that +(G) = 1 − 2 · G−: for some
2 > 0 and : > 0, and for all G greater than some G0. Then E()!) < ∞.
An example of private signal distributions + and − for which− and+ have this
form is given by the probability density functions
5−(G) =

2 · e−GG−:−1 when 1 ≤ G
0 when − 1 < G < 1
2 · (−G)−:−1 when G ≤ −1.
and 5+(G) = 5−(−G), for an appropriate choice of normalizing constant 2 > 0. In
this case, −(−G) = 1 − +(G) = 2: G
−: for all G > 1.9
8Recall that − is the conditional cumulative distribution function of the private log-likelihood
ratios !C .
9Theorem 6 can be proved for other thick-tailed private signal distributions: for example, one
could take different values of 2 and : for − and +, or one could replace their thick polynomial
tails by even thicker logarithmic tails. For the sake of readability, we choose to focus on this case.
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The proof of Theorem 6 is rather technically involved, and we provide here a rough
sketch of the ideas behind it.
We say that there is an upset at time C if 0C−1 ≠ 0C . We denote by Ξ the random
variable which assigns to each outcome the total number of upsets
Ξ = |{C : 0C−1 ≠ 0C}|.
We say that there is a run of length < from time C if 0C = 0C+1 = · · · = 0C+<−1. As
we will condition on \ = +1 in our analysis, we say that a run from time C is good if
0C = 1 and bad otherwise. A trivial but important observation is that the number of
maximal finite runs is equal to the number of upsets, and so if Ξ = =, and if )! = C,
then there is at least one run of length C/= before time C. Qualitatively, this implies
that if the number of upsets is small, and if the time to learn is large, then there is at
least one long run before the time to learn.
We show that it is indeed unlikely that Ξ is large: the distribution of Ξ has an
exponential tail. Incidentally, this holds for any private signal distribution:
Proposition 7. For every private signal distribution, there exist 2 > 0 and 0 < W < 1
such that for all = > 0
P(Ξ ≥ =) ≤ 2W=.
Intuitively, this holds because whenever an agent takes the correct action, there is
a non-vanishing probability that all subsequent agents will also do so, and no more
upsets will occur.
Thus, it is very unlikely that the number of upsets Ξ is large. As we observe above,
when Ξ is small, then the time to learn )! can only be large if at least one of the runs
is long. When− has a thin tail, then this is possible; indeed, Theorem 5 shows that
the first finite run has infinite expected length when private signals are Gaussian.
However, when − has a thick, polynomial left tail of order G−: , we show that it is
very unlikely for any run to be long: the probability that there is a run of length =
decays at least as fast as exp(−=:/(:+1)), and in particular runs have finite expected
length. Intuitively, when strong signals are rare, then runs tend to be long as agents
are likely to emulate their predecessor. Conversely, when strong signals are more
likely, then agents are more likely to break a run, and so runs tend to be shorter.
Putting together these insights, we conclude that it is unlikely that there are many
runs, and, in the polynomial signal case, it is unlikely that runs are long. Thus )!
has finite expectation.
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Probability of taking the wrong action
Yet another natural metric of the speed of learning is the probability of mistake
?C = P(0C ≠ \).
Calculating the asymptotic behavior of ?C seems harder to tackle.
For the Gaussian case, while we cannot estimate ?C precisely, Theorem 5 immedi-
ately implies a lower bound: ?C is at least :/C1+Y, for every Y > 0 and : that depends
on Y. This is much larger than the exponentially vanishing probability of mistake in
the revealed signal baseline case.
More generally, we can use Theorem 1 to show that ?C vanishes sub-exponentially
for any signal distribution, in the sense that
lim
C→∞
1
C
log ?C = 0.
To see this, note that the probability of mistake at time C − 1, conditioned on the
observed actions, is exactly equal to
min{`C , 1 − `C};
where we recall that
`C = P(\ = +1|01, . . . , 0C−1) =
eℓC
eℓC + 1
is the public belief. This is due to the fact that if the outside observer, who holds
belief `C , had to choose an action, she would choose 0C−1, the action of the last
player she observed, a player who has strictly more information than her. Thus
?C = E(min{`C , 1 − `C}) = E
(
1
e|ℓC | + 1
)
,
and since, by Theorem 1, |ℓC | is sub-linear, it follows that ?C is sub-exponential.
2.4 Conclusion
In this paper we consider a classical setting of sequential asymptotic learning from
actions of others. We show that learning from actions is slow, as compared to the
speed of learning when observing others’ private signals, in the sense that the public
log-likelihood ratio tends more slowly to infinity. However, it is possible to approach
the linear rate of learning from signals and achieve any sub-linear rate.
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We calculate the speed of learning precisely in the case of Normal private signals
(among a large class of private signal distributions) and show that learning is very
slow. We also show that in the Gaussian case the expected time to learn is infinite,
as opposed to cases of more thick-tailed distributions, in which it is finite.
For the Gaussian case, we also provide a lower bound for the probability of mistake.
Finding a matching upper bound seems beyond our reach at the moment, and
provides a compelling open problem for further research.
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C h a p t e r 3
SUBSIDIZING LEMONS FOR EFFICIENT INFORMATION
AGGREGATION
The aggregation of information in society is a complex and, at the same time, a very
interesting process from an economic point of view. Especially it is interesting to
see how it affects individuals’ choices. People’s decisions often rely on two types of
information. The first one is their private knowledge about the choice they face. The
second source is information received from society, in particular what other people
did before. Social learning models have been used to analyze how people make
decisions based on these types of information. They explain phenomena such as
herding (Banerjee, 1992), informational cascades (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
Welch, 1992), and asymptotic learning (L. Smith and Sørensen, 2000).
Usually, these models have huge inefficiencies. For example, people might end up
in the wrong cascade. Furthermore, when herding occurs, people’s actions convey
much less information about their private signals than they do in the beginning. One
of the reasons this happens is because people do not take into account how their
actions affect future generations’ utility. The main aftermath of this is a decrease in
social welfare and in the asymptotic speed of learning (Hann-Caruthers, Martynov,
and Tamuz, 2018). A natural question arises: how can we improve this social
learning system?
In this paper, we start with the classical sequential learning model with binary states
of nature and corresponding binary actions. Our leading example is the case inwhich
there are two goods/technologies on the market: the old one, whose characteristics
are well-known to everybody, and the new one, which is better than the former one
in one state of the world and worse in the other. The actions here are represented by
buying either the new or the old product. Agents have the same preferences: they
want their actions to match the underlying state. Players get private signals that are
i.i.d. conditioned on the realized state of the world. The players are exogenously
ordered and, in every time period, one agent chooses which product to buy based
on her private signal and the actions of her predecessors.
A social planner would like to maximize the discounted sum of players’ utilities.
She can choose relative prices, by taxing or subsidizing the goods in every period,
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that are publicly observed. In other words, she chooses a cost which can be positive,
negative, or zero, of the new product, normalizing the price of the old one to be 0.
The social planner’s choice is based on the public information available at that time:
prices in previous periods and corresponding players’ actions.
We find the optimal pricing policy which, perhaps, is counterintuitive: tax the good
that is more likely to be better. This results in an expected loss today, because
agents whose private information is not strong enough are less likely to buy the
better product. But at the same time, their choice will give the social planner more
information about their private signals, which in its turn significantly increases the
utility of future generations.
As a motivational example, imagine there are two drugs that treat the same disease
but have unknown benefits/side effects, as they were tested only on a small sample
of population. The only way the government can collect information about the real
effects is by observing which one people bought given their personal and public
knowledge. Here, the government plays the role of the social planner who can tax or
subsidize one drug or the other. Without it, there is a significant risk that society will
stick with the wrong medicine or that it will learn the truth very slowly. We show
how these risks become lower when the social planner is involved in this process.
Our model overcomes a major criticism of the sequential social learning model—the
assumption that players have to know the order in which the actions were taken by
their predecessors, and then make a complicated calculation by Bayes rule to obtain
the current public belief. In our setup, the optimal prices are functions of the public
belief, which contains all the necessary information about the past. In equilibrium
agents can recover the public belief from the price, and do not need to know the
actions and specific order of their predecessors. Thus, agents only need to observe
the current price and private signals to choose the optimal action.
We start with introducing the model, describing individuals’ and the social planner’s
behaviors, and providing an intuitive illustration of how prices change the belief -
action relationship. After this, we go to the binary signals case and calculate the
expected utility function and its asymptotic characteristics when X goes to 1. On
the way to these results, we establish a few interesting and helpful properties of the
binary case. We show that the public belief is a random walk that depends on the
difference between the number of 86ℎ and !>F signals up to this point. Another
property is that when an agent takes into account their private signal, their expected
utility is equal to the signals’ precision.
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In the next section, we study continuous distributions: bounded and unbounded.
We find that there is still a difference in terms of asymptotic learning: when private
signals have bounded strength, the underlying state is never revealed. However, the
beliefs at which learning stops are closer to 0 and 1 than they would be without the
social planner. For general signal distributions, this problem becomes very complex
and we can not find the analytical solution. But we provide a good qualitative
description for a specific unbounded signal distribution. This description looks
similar to the one in the binary case: when one product seems to be better, it should
be taxed in order to extract more information in the future periods and exploit the
convexity of the expected utility function. Moreover, the prices are bounded away
from 0 and 1 when the public belief converges to one of the extreme values. This
implies that eventually people are going to buy the right product with probabilities
close to 1, but at the same time, it is going to be positively priced to increase the
social benefits. Finally, we calculate numerically the expected utility and the optimal
pricing function for this signal distribution.
Literature review
Several previous studies consider a similar question: how prices might affect social
learning in different scenarios.
Crapis, Ifrach, Maglaras, Scarsini (Crapis et al., 2016) consider a situation when
people with heterogeneous preferences observe not only actions of their predeces-
sors, but also their reviews of the product, the outcome, in a non-Baysian framework.
Numerical experiments suggest that pricing policies that account for social learning
may increase revenues considerably relative to policies that do not.
Papanastasiou, Savva (Papanastasiou and Savva, 2016) and Bhalla (Bhalla, 2012)
allow both buyers and a monopolist to act strategicly over a finite number of time
periods. The first one finds that the social learning increases the firm’s expected
profit and contrary to previous results in the literature, preannounced prices are
not beneficial to the firm. The second one shows that prices are no longer sub-
martingales, but that for some range of beliefs they can be super-martingales, too.
In a more classic setup, Bose, Orosel, Ottaviani, and Vesterlund (Bose et al., 2006)
consider a binary model when a monopolists chooses pricing strategy in order to
maximize its revenue and incurs some cost to produce the product. They find some
qualitative results. For example the objective is convex, increases in number of
periods the game is played, and that at some point herding occurs.
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One more working paper (L. Smith, Sørensen, and Tian, 2020) studies optimal
experimentation in herding. They have a similar setup where they try to maximize
discounted sum of agents’ utilities by introducing “an infinite-lived planner who de-
vises individual choice rule”. They find that planner’s cutoff private belief increases
with the increase in public belief (when signals satisfy log-concavity condition),
which conforms with our finding that optimal prices rise in the public belief. They
also suggest a mechanism which allows to make this socially optimal process de-
centralized, e.g. allows to get rid off the planner. However, they do not provide
solutions for the optimal planner’s choice rules or the value function as it has been
technically challenging for a long time. We believe that these results, as well as
other interesting comparative statics that are done in this paper, are an essential part
if we want to apply this useful and interesting theory to real life applications or
experiments.
There is also some literature on optimal pricing in networks. Candogan, Bimpikis
and Ozdaglar (Candogan, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar, 2012) study the optimal pricing
strategy of a monopolist in a two-period game, where an agent’s utility depends not
only on her action, but also on decisions of her neighbors. They find that optimal
price should depend on Bonacich centrality, on a markup term proportional to the
influence that the network exerts and on a term that is independent of the network.
Another paper in this area is by Campbel (Campbell, 2013). He models a firm’s
ability to strategically influence the probability individual engages in,$" , Word
of Mouth, through the price. The author derives the comparative static results of
connectivity, mean-preserving spread of friendships, and clustering of friends on
price.
3.1 Model
Let \ ∈ {86ℎ, !>F} be the true state of the world, where both states a priori are
equally likely.1 At the beginning of the game, one state is realized and does not
change.
There are countably many rational agents C ∈ {1, 2, . . . }, who receive private signals
BC . These signals are i.i.d. conditional on the state of the world: if \ = 86ℎ, they
have cumulative distribution function (CDF)  and if \ = !>F — ! . The
corresponding PDFs are 6 and 6! . We assume that signals never completely reveal
1We make this simplification of a (1/2,1/2) prior to reduce the complexity of the presentation,
but all results hold for general priors
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the true state, which is the same as saying that the conditional distributions are
absolutely continuous with respect to each other.
Suppose there are two products on the market with different prices in each time
period: the new one and the old one. When \ = 86ℎ, the new product is better
than the old one and when \ = !>F — vise versa. Each agent C has a decision to
make: whether to buy the newproduct (0C = 1) and pay the price 2C or to stickwith the
old one (0C = 0). We normalize the price of the old product to be equal to 0. Utility
of each agent from the action 0C is 1, if it matches the state (0C = 0 and \ = !>F or
0C = 1 and \ = 86ℎ)), minus the cost, if she buys the new product, -1{0C = 1}2C .
Players act sequentially and their decisions are based on two types of information:
private information from their own private signal BC and public information (history)
ℎC . The latter one includes actions that were taken before player C and the sequence
of prices of the new good 2C , so ℎC = {01, 02, . . . 0C−1, 21, 22, . . . 2C−1}. Before we
explain what is the real role of 2C , we need some notation.
Agent’s decision process
Denote the posterior belief of the agent C that the new good is better by
`C = P(\ = 86ℎ |ℎC , BC).
We will also refer to it as the total belief as it combines public and private informa-
tion. Also, let us call the corresponding likelihood ratio, `C/(1 − `C), — the total
likelihood ratio.
Note that `C also represents the expected utility of player C for taking action 1, not
including the price. As ℎC and BC are independent of each other, the posterior belief
has two components: the private belief P(\ = 1|BC), which is known only to player
C, and the public belief ?C = P(\ = 1|ℎC), which is known to everyone who observed
history up to time C. Also, denote by ;C the likelihood ratio of the public belief
;C =
?C
1 − ?C
·
We can see that there is a monotone bijection between the public belief and its
likelihood ratio and we are going to use them interchangeably. As ?C ∈ [0, 1] then
;C ∈ [0,∞]. Also denote by  (;C), ! (;C) the CDF’s of ;C conditional on \.
The posterior belief `C captures how confident the player is about buying the new
product. We obtain ?C from ?0 = 1/2 and ℎC using Bayes rule.
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Now let us go back to 2C . Suppose that 2C = 0. As agents are expected utility
maximizers, player C buys the new product if her posterior belief `C is greater than
1/2. Now, if 2C ≠ 0, then she buys it only if `C ≥ 1/2 + 2C/2: if she buys the new
product then her expected utility is `C − 2C which has to be greater or equal to 1− `C
— the utility from buying the old product. In other words, these prices reflect how
confident you should be in the new product in comparison to the old one, in order
for you to buy the former one.
We can summarize it in the following way

0C = 0, utility 1 − `C when `C < 12 +
2C
2
0C = 1, utility `C − 2C when `C ≥ 12 +
2C
2
The agent wants to guess the correct state of the world (0C = \) in general. But there
are some situations when it is more profitable to take the opposite action in order to
avoid the cost 2C . Imagine that `C = 0.57 and 2C = 0.15. Even though the total belief
tells us to buy the new product (`C > 0.5), we would get less utility by doing this
(0.57 − 0.15 = 0.42) rather than buying the old one (1 − 0.57 = 0.43). Hence, the
price forces some people with a not very strong belief to switch to a “non-optimal”
action, while people with a strong belief are not affected by it.
We can also state this condition in terms of the likelihood ratio: 0C = 1 iff2
`C
1 − `C
=
?C
1 − ?C
6 (BC)
6! (BC)
≥ :C ,
where
:C =
1 + 2C/2
1 − 2C/2
·
If 2C = 0 (:C = 1), we get the usual conditions for taking action 1 .We are going
to use both 2C (for beliefs) and :C (for likelihood ratios) as prices but in different
settings. Notice that we can rewrite the condition above as follows
?C
(1 − ?C):C
· 6 (BC)
6! (BC)
≥ 1.
We can interpret this as if there were no price, :C = 1, but we had a lower public
belief that corresponds to the likelihood ratio ?C/((1 − ?C):C).
2For simplicity, we assume that agents choose action 1 when indifferent. This will have no
impact on our results.
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Definition 1. Let us call ?C/((1− ?C):C) —modified likelihood ratio. Similarly, we
call the public belief that corresponds to the modified likelihood ratio — modified
public belief.
Last thing we mention here is how the public belief evolves after another player
takes an action. If at time C the public belief is ?C and the price is :C , then the public
belief at time C + 1 after taking action 0C = 1 satisfies the following formula
;C+1 =
?C+1
1 − ?C+1
=
?C
1 − ?C
· 1 −  (H)
1 − ! (H)
,
where H = (1 − ?C):C/?C and 8 - CDFs of the likelihood ratio conditioned on the
true state. And if 0C = 0,
;C+1 =
?C+1
1 − ?C+1
=
?C
1 − ?C
·  (H)
! (H)
·
This is an application of the Bayes rule, given that player C buys (does not buy) the
new product if her total likelihood ratio is above (below) :C . This implies that her
private likelihood ratio is above (below) (1 − ?C):C/?C .
Now let us look at this game from the social planner’s perspective, who would like
to maximize the discounted sum of the expected utilities of agents with a discount
factor X.
Social planner
We introduce a long run risk neutral social planner who chooses a price, by taxing
or subsidizing the new product, in each period and then returns the collected money
to players in the following way. If in time period C − 1 2C−1 was collected from
player C − 1, then this money is put in the bank with the interest rate 1/X and
returned to player C in the next period. This mechanism implies two things. First,
redistribution does not affect players’ decisions and they still act according to the
previous subsection. This is true because player’s C choice does not change how
much money she gets back; this is already decided by the previous player. Second,
the total amount of money that is taken from the players is 0, budget-balanced.
Thus, the discounted sum of players’ payoff is equal to the discounted sum of
DC (`C , 2C) = 1{0C (`C , 2C) = 1}`C + 1{0C (`C , 2C) = 0}(1 − `C). Therefore, the utility
function of the social planner who implements a pricing strategy {2C}∞C=1 is
D{:C } (?) =
∞∑
C=1
DC (`C (?, ℎC−1, BC), :C),
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where `C (?, ℎC−1, BC) means that it is path dependent.
Due to the money redistribution defined above, if `C > 1/2 and player C buys the
new product, we treat her utility from society’s prospective as just `C instead of
subtracting the price, as it is returned later. But from the players perspective, they
still take into account the price.
The optimal pricing strategy plays another crucial role in this model. Imagine that
the social planner does not do anything (∀C :C = 1), then when the herd occurs,
the difference between public beliefs in two consequitive periods converges to 0
extremely quickly. This is shown in (Hann-Caruthers, Martynov, and Tamuz, 2018).
Without loss of generality, assume that they are buying the new product. But if we
set a high price for the new product and observe that people are still buying it, then
the posterior belief would grow faster than before. In other words, the asymptotic
speed of learning would increase.
Let us denote by D(?C) the expected utility of the social planner with the public belief
?C when we use the optimal prices :∗C . Due to the stationarity of the social planner’s
problem, the expected utility depends on the history only through the public belief.
Then it should satisfy the following Bellman equation:
D(?C) = max
:C
{(1 − X) (expected gain(?C) − expected loss(:C , ?C)) + X E D(?C+1)}.
(3.1)
The expected gain calculates the expected utility in this period if there were no price,
E DC (`C , 1). First, we calculate the expected `C , and then the expected payoff is equal
to max(`C , 1 − `C). If we receive a private signal with a likelihood ratio G, then the
total likelihood ratio is equal to H = ?CG/(1 − ?C) and therefore, `C = H/(H + 1).
Depending on whether the corresponding likelihood ratio is above or below 1, the
expected utility is either equal to `C or 1 − `C , so we divide this into two cases:
0 ≤ G ≤ (1 − ?C)/?C and G > (1 − ?C)/?C . Therefore, the expected gain(?C) is equal
to ∫ 1−?C
?C
0
(
1 −
G
?C
1−?C
G
?C
1−?C + 1
)
(?C 5 (G) + (1 − ?C) 5! (G))3G+
+
∫ ∞
1−?C
?C
(
G
?C
1−?C
G
?C
1−?C + 1
)
(?C 5 (G) + (1 − ?C) 5! (G))3G.
The second term, the expected loss(:C , ?C), calculates utility that agent loses due to
a non-optimal action. Notice that if we apply price :C , then the only loss that can
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Red area
corresponds to the private likelihood ratios when people take non-optimal actions. Here, `C = (G ?C1−?C )/(G
?C
1−?C + 1) .
Figure 3.1: Private likelihood ratios and today payoff.
occur is when the likelihood ratio of the private signal is strong enough to make the
total likelihood ratio less than 1 for the modified likelihood ratio (1 − ?C):C/?C , but
not for the initial one, (1 − ?C)/?C . When this happens, the likelihood ratio of the
private signal G can be between (1 − ?C)/?C and (1 − ?C):C/?C . If the total belief is
`C , then the loss that player bears is `C − (1− `C) = 2`C − 1. Therefore, the expected
loss(:C , ?C) is equal to∫ 1
0
(
2G ?C1−?C
G
?C
1−?C + 1
− 1
)
(?C 5 (G) + (1 − ?C) 5! (G))3G,
where 0 = (1 − ?C)/?C , 1 = (1 − ?C):C/?C .
The high complexity of this problem is due to the intricacy of the randomwalk of the
public belief. Equation (3.1) shows the trade-off between losing some utility today
due to the fact that some people (whose posterior likelihood is between 1 and :C)
take a non-optimal action (and paying (2`C − 1) for this) and gaining utility through
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more of a disperse belief tomorrow. The latter one occurs due to the convexity of D
which we prove a bit later.
In other words, strategic pricing can help to aggregate information more efficiently
and increase the social welfare as well as speed up the asymptotic learning.
In the subsequent sections, we are going to consider both discrete and continuous,
bounded and unbounded private signals and analyze how it affects properties of the
optimal pricing policy and the corresponding solution. But before doing this, we
are going to state a general property of the expected utility function.
Proposition 8. The expected utility function D(?) is convex, D(1) = D(0) = 1, and
is symmetric around 1/2, i.e D(?) = D(1 − ?).
Most of the time, we are going to assume, without loss of generality, that ?C ≥ 0.5,
so the new product is a priory better, and will try to find the optimal price or at least
a price that is better than no price at all. For ?C < 0.5, a symmetric analysis applies.
3.2 Binary signals
In this section, we are going to calculate the utility and the optimal strategy of the
social planner when private signals are Bernoulli distributed. This means that each
agent is going to be told whether the state is 86ℎ or !>F as her private signal, and
this information is going to be correct with probability @ > 1/2.
Definition 2. Define a learning period, !%C to be all periods C′ up to time C,
conditioned on ℎC , such that a player C′ took into account her private signal when
she chose an action 0C ′.
We abuse notation a bit and ignore the subscript C as it is going to be clear which
period we have in mind. If people disregard their private signals when they take
actions, then the public belief does not change, so in this sense, we do not learn in
these periods. It is helpful to keep in mind this distinction between !% and not !%.
There are a few nice characteristics of the binary distribution. The first one is that
if C is in the learning period, then agent C’s action reveals her private signal. Indeed,
if we know that people are going to take into account their private signals, then the
only possibility is that they act according to them.
Lemma 9. If C ∈ !%, then player C′s action, 0C , reveals her private signal BC .
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Thus, during the learning period actions not only convey but also reveal the infor-
mation.
The second one is that there are only two nontrivial multipliers by which we update
the likelihood ratio: either we observe the 86ℎ signal and multiply ;C by
P(\ = 86ℎ |BC = 86ℎ)
P(\ = !>F |BC = 86ℎ)
=
@
1 − @ ,
or we observe the !>F signal and then multiply ;C by
P(\ = 86ℎ|BC = !>F)
P(\ = !>F |BC = !>F)
=
1 − @
@
·
When player C ignores BC , we do not update the public belief, so ;C is multiplied by
1, and from now on all claims about the public belief assume that actions depend
on the private signals. Thus, if player C’s action is informative, then ;C is multiplied
by either @/(1 − @) or (1 − @)/@ depending on her action.
The third, and the best characteristic of the binary case is summarized in the follow-
ing lemma.
Lemma 10. In the binary case, the public belief is a random walk and its position
depends on the difference in the number of times we observed86ℎ and !>F signals.
Moreover, if we observed = 86ℎ signals and : !>F ones between periods C and
C + = + : , then the likelihood ratio at time C + = + : is
;=+: = ;C ·
(
@
1 − @
)=−:
Lemma 10 tells us that in order to find ;C , we just need to calculate the difference in
number of times agents took actions 1 and 0 during the !% and take @/(1 − @) to
the corresponding power.
Definition 3. We say, the public belief (LR) goes up if we observed the 86ℎ signal
during LP. Analogously, the public belief (LR) goes down if we observed the !>F
one.
Notice that the public belief increases (decreases)when it goes up (down) as @ > 1/2.
If at time C we have ?C = 1/2 and we go = times up, then by Bayes rule the public
belief is
?C+= =
@=
@= + (1 − @)= (3.2)
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Where ? (:) = @
:
@:+(1−@): and ? (−:) =
(1−@):
@:+(1−@): as in (3.4).
Figure 3.2: Random walk of the public belief with binary signals.
and if we go down = times from ?C = 1/2, then
?C+= =
(1 − @)=
@= + (1 − @)= · (3.3)
Definition 4. For : ≥ 0, define level : to be the public belief if it observed : more
86ℎ signals than !>F ones and denote it by ?(:). Similarly, define level (−:) to
be the public belief if we observed : more !>F than 86ℎ ones and denote it by
?(−:) 
?(:) = @
:
@: + (1 − @):
?(−:) = (1 − @)
:
@: + (1 − @):
(3.4)
where : > 0.
For example, public belief 1/2 corresponds to level 0.
The last property we mention is that if :C = 1, then agents start ignoring their private
signals (learning period stops) (a cascade3 occurs) after one or two people take the
3This is an event in the classical model when people disregard their private signals and take
the same action, thus public belief does not update after this. Once it has started, it does not stop.
Although in our model we are able to stop it by introducing a price, which brings the public belief
back to the region where agents act according to their private signals
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same action. If we start with ?C = 1/2 and someone takes action 1, ?C+1 will be equal
to @. Even if the next player gets !>F private signal, her posterior belief is going to
be 1/2, hence, she would take action 1 disregarding her private signal. This means
we stop aggregating private information extremely quickly and therefore unable to
get to a high public belief, which hurts social welfare.
To improve this situation, by maximizing the social welfare, we are going to imple-
ment the optimal pricing scheme. The following lemma will help in our analysis.
Lemma 11. There exists an optimal strategy of the following form: the social
planner 1) picks # ∈ N, and 2) chooses prices such that actions reveal the private
signals until the public belief reaches either level # or −# . After that there are no
prices, :C = 1.
Notice that from the social planner’s perspective this game is stationary. Thus, in
this binary situation, there is only one way how she can affect the outcome: she can
choose how long we are going to distinguish signals, so how long does the learning
period continue. As we said above, due to the stationarity, there is no incentive to
choose a non-zero price 2C once the learning period has ended. Notice that since we
are not biased towards one or the other state, these two levels should be symmetric
around 1/2: upper bound — level # , lower bound — −# .
Thus, we pick # ∈ N at the beginning, and then in every period, until ?C hits either
level # or −# , choose a price which allows us to separate 86ℎ and !>F private
signals. This is the pricing scheme.
How exactly do these prices look like? Suppose, at time C the likelihood ratio ;C > 1
(?C is greater than 1/2), which we assume is above @/(1 − @) (otherwise, do not
need any price, we are still going to figure out the private signal from the action),
then the social planner chooses a price :C > 1 such that
;C
:C
=
@
1 − @ − Y >
1
2
,
for a small, positive Y.
Now, we go back to the initial problem (3.1). Recall that one of our goals is to
maximize the social welfare. To do this, first we need to calculate our expected
utility from starting at the public belief 1/2, D(0.5), when private information is
acquired until ?C hits one of the barriers that are at distance # from the initial belief
1/2. And we are interested in # which maximizes D(0.5).
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Let us start with a few observations.
Lemma 12. The expected utility that the social planner gets today in the learning
period is @.
There is a simple intuition behind this. As our action follows our signal in !%, we
take the right action only with probability @. If the true state of the world is 86ℎ,
we receive the corresponding signal only with probability @. Hence, we are going
to make the right action with the same probability, which equals to our expected
utility today.
Now, let us go back to our Bellman equation and rewrite it for this case
D(?(=)) = (1 − X)@ + X (P(signal 86ℎ)D(?(= + 1)) + P(signal !>F)D(?(= − 1))) ,
(3.5)
where P(signal 86ℎ) = (?C@ + (1 − ?C) (1 − @)) and P(signal !>F) = ?C (1 − @) +
(1 − ?C)@. We choose # in order to maximize utility at 1/2, ?(0).
This is better than the general form (3.1) but still complicated, as the probability of
going up or down depends on the current public belief.
Fortunately, in order to calculate D(?(#)), the analysis can be simplified. Recall
that the only thing that the social planner controls is how far away are the absorbing
boundaries from 1/2, in other words she chooses # . After it is fixed, with probability
1/2 we are going to be in the 86ℎ state and the probability of going up is just @
instead of ?C@ + (1− ?C) (1− @), and the probability of going down is (1− @) instead
of (1 − ?C)@ + ?C (1 − @). Also, with probability 1/2, we are in the !>F state and
again can simplify recurrence relation (3.5). Therefore, our utility at 1/2 is going
to be the average of D (?(#)) and D! (?(#)), where D8 (?(#)) are defined by the
following recurrence problems: in the 86ℎ state
D (?(:)) = (1 − X)@ + X(@D (?(: + 1)) + (1 − @)D (?(: − 1)))
D (?(2#)) = ?(#) = @
#
@# +(1−@)#
D (?(0)) = ?(−#) = (1−@)
#
@# +(1−@)#
(3.6)
and in the !>F state
D! (?(:)) = (1 − X)@ + X((1 − @)D! (?(: + 1)) + @D! (?(: − 1)))
D! (?(#)) = 1 − ?(#) = (1−@)
#
@# +(1−@)#
D! (?(−#)) = 1 − ?(−#) = @
#
@# +(1−@)#
(3.7)
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Here, the boundary conditions come from the fact that when we reach levels # or
−# , we stop learning and in every period just receive expected utility that is equal
to the belief. To sum up the paragraph above, if we can solve two problems (3.6)
and (3.7), we can get D(?(0)).
Theorem 13. The expected utility of public belief 1/2 when we stop learning upon
arrival at levels 2# or 0 has the following form
D
(
1
2
)
=
(
@#
@# +(1−@)# − @
)
−
(
− (1−@)
#
(1−@)# +@# + @
) (
1−@
@
)#
0#1 + 0
#
2
+ @,
and
08 =
1
2
(
1
X@
±
√
1
X2@2
− 4
@
+ 4
)
.
To prove this theorem, we use recurrence and linear equations, techniques. To get the
utility function for some other initial level : (with belief ?(:)), the same technique
can be applied.
Even though this may not look very friendly, the numerator has a nice interpretation.
The first term is a difference between the public belief at level # and our precision
@, which is also our belief at level 1. Similarly, the first multiplier of the second
term is a difference between our precision and the public belief at level −# . And
the second multiplier is the likelihood ratio of observing # signals !>F.
Given Theorem 13, we can solve for the optimal # and the utility at 1/2 for any @ and
X. For example, when X = 0.9, @ = 0.7 the expected utility at 1/2 as a function of
stopping level # is depicted in Figure 3.3. The optimal #∗ = 4 and D(0.5) = 0.802
in this case. If we do not have any prices, this expected utility is 0.7. Furthermore,
in the optimal pricing case we end up with probability around ?C = 0.97 that we
choose the right action (stopping public belief), comparing it to no price case where
we end up with ?C = 0.7.
Moreover, it is going to be shown in the next subsection that for a fixed X, the
optimal #∗ does not go to infinity no matter how we change @. This implies that it
is impossible to learn the underlying state unless X = 1.
Furthermore, we not only increase the social welfare, but also end up with a much
higher public belief about one of the states. In this case, instead of stopping at
@ = 0.7, we are going to stop at ?C = 0.9674 conditioned on the public belief being
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Figure 3.3: Expected utility at ?0 = 1/2 as a function of stopping time # .
absorbed at the upper bound. Recall, that if we do not have any price, then the
random walk stops after one (two) steps because a cascade occurs. Given that we
have a drift towards the underlying state, making boundaries further away from 1/2
significantly decreases probability of ending up in the wrong cascade. We have this
lemma to formalize it.
Lemma 14. If it is optimal to stop the learning phase upon reaching level # or −#
then the probability of ending up in the wrong cascade is(
1−@
@
)2#
−
(
1−@
@
)#(
1−@
@
)2#
− 1
Again, for @ = 0.7, X = 0.9 the optimal # is 4 and so the probability of ending up
in the wrong cascade is about 0.03, compared to 1 − @ = 0.3 in a situation without
prices. It is easy to see that this probability goes to 0 as ((1 − @)/@)# . Thus,
acquiring information for a few steps dramatically decreases the probability of the
wrong cascade.
Onemore thing should bementioned beforewe start analyzing asymptotic properties
of D(?), when X → 1. As we vary the stopping level # , the expected utilities at
different levels increase (decrease) simultaneously. This again happens due to
stationarity of the social planner’s problem.
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Proposition 15. If D(?(8)) changes when we vary # , then it increases (decreases)
iff D(?(0)) increases (decreases).
In the proceeding section, we are going to analyze behavior of the optimal # and
corresponding D(0.5) when the social planner becomes patient, i.e. X→ 1.
Patient planner
It seems unlikely that there exists a closed form solution for the optimal # due
to the complex form of D and because we are maximizing over natural numbers,
which automatically prevents us from using the usual techniques. With numerical
calculations, this optimal # can be easily found.
However, we can understand the behavior of # for a patient social planner. Let us
unfold this statement. Consider the function D(0.5) from Theorem 13 when @ is
close to 1. If X is bounded away from 1, then 02 > 1 and as 01 > 0 and all terms
in nominator are bounded by 1 − @ ∀# , hence, #∗ does not go to infinity (stays
“finite”). This is a very natural result as if the precision of the private signals is high
then we are more likely to get to a high public belief quicker and lose a significant
utility for waiting extra rounds. If @ = 0.999, then, after observing just one 86ℎ
signal, public belief becomes ?1 = 0.999 and we know it can never be above 1, so
there is no incentive to wait for more signals, the social planner should stop learning
now.
On the other hand, if the social planner is extremely patient, i.e. X goes to 1, then
the denominator converges to 1 and the nominator is an increasing function of # ,
so #∗ goes to∞. There is also a good intuition for this fact. If he is very patient his
utility today matters less, and also gaining some small amount, i.e. 0.01 extra, in
the public belief can result in a significant increment of the total utility, even if we
have to spend 10 extra periods to get it.
A natural question occurs: what happens to #∗ if both @ and X go to 1? Does it go
to infinity? It turns out that in this regime, #∗ is of order ln(1 − X)/ln(1 − @). We
prove this by first showing that the optimal # ∈ R is of this order and then connect
it to the optimal #∗ ∈ N.
Proposition 16. ∃ Y, W > 0 such that for @ > 1 − Y and X > 1 − W, the optimal #∗
satisfies the following inequalities for some constants A1, A2
A1
ln(1 − X)
ln(1 − @) ≥ #
∗ ≥ A2
ln(1 − X)
ln(1 − @) ·
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This result tells us that for #∗ to remain constant, (1 − X) must go to 0 as fast,
(1 − @)2 for some constant 2. It is an interesting relationship between the precision
of private signals and the patience of the social planner.
Another interesting case is when X → 1, and @ is fixed. We conjecture that as the
planner becomes more patient, absorbing public beliefs become more extreme and
D(0.5) gets closer to 1, maximum possible utility. We calculate the rate at which it
approaches 1 using a few facts from the proof of Proposition 16.
Proposition 17. As X goes to 1, utility at belief 1/2 goes to 1 with the following rate
D# (0.5) = 1 −$ ((1 − X) ln(1 − X)).
This result tells us that as we increase X, and consequently increase #∗, 1 − D(0.5)
goes almost exponentially quickly to 0.
3.3 Continuous signal distribution
We now consider a continuous distribution of private signals rather than binary.
Continuity gives us more freedom in our actions as the social planner. For example,
we have a finer trade-off between the expected loss and expected gain in period C.
Also, it will allow us to make the expected loss that occurs due to a non-zero price
as small as we want.
In the binary case, the expected loss is bounded away from 0 unless :C = 1. Recall
that in the binary case, the actuall loss, if it occured, was ?C − @ > 0 if ?C > 1/2
(1 − ?C − @ > 0 if it is less) and increasing with the public belief, when the latter
gets closer to the boundary levels. Moreover, when we had non-zero prices, the loss
occured with probability 1 − @, making the expected loss bounded away from 0.
This is an aspect of the discrete distributions because even if you have a very high
public belief, there is still a probability of making the wrong action (conditioned on
being in the learning period) which is bounded away from zero.
The likelihood ratio of the private signal 6 (G)/6! (G) has cumulative distribution
function  in the 86ℎ state and ! in the !>F state. Again, as in the classi-
cal model, we are going to consider two cases: when signals have bounded and
unbounded strength. Let us start with the former one.
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Bounded private signals
Assume that the private signals are bounded in a sense that4
1 >
@
1 − @ ≥
6 (G)
6! (G)
≥ 1 − @
@
> 0·
So the agents can not get arbitrary strong information about either state. This implies
that if ;C > @/(1 − @) and :C = 1, then player C disregards her private signal as her
total likelihood ratio is always above 1. Analogously, if ;C < (1 − @)/@ and :C = 1,
then the total likelihood ratio is always below 1.
The main result in this case is similar to the one in the classical literature. Unless
we have an extremely patient social planner, X = 1, it is impossible to learn the
underlying state of the world. To put it differently, it is optimal to stop the !% before
?C reaches 1 or 0, as the expected loss is going to be bigger than the expected gain
for high enough ?C . Notice that it also applies to situations when there are finitely
many types of private signals, that are not completely revealing.
Theorem 18. If distributions of the private belief are bounded and X < 1, then there
exists ? < 1 and ? > 0 such that ? ≤ ?C ≤ ?.
To prove this theorem, we first bound the expected gain in the public belief and
then translate it to the expected gain in the utility. The latter one is compared to the
expected loss.
This result can be explained by the choice of the form of utility function, discounted
sum. It makes the social planner care more about the current generations rather
than the ones that are far away in the future, even if X is close to 1. Still, we can
see from the proof that as X increases, the public belief is able to get closer to the
extreme beliefs. Which makes the society more certain about the realized state. We
also conjecture that the expected utility significantly increases from the “no prices”
case, as it did in the previous section.
In the next subsection, we are going to investigate how prices affect the outcome in
the case of unbounded signals. In particular, we are going see what happens to the
asymptotic speed of learning comparing to the classical model (Hann-Caruthers,
Martynov, and Tamuz, 2018).
4We assume symmetry of private signals without loss of generality.
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Unbounded private signals
Now we would like to see whether the prices in fact increase the asymptotic speed
of learning at the same time as they increase the social welfare.
To remind what the asymptotic speed of learning is, recall that in the classical model
with unbounded signals people eventually start choosing the correct action, 1 if the
state is 86ℎ and 0 otherwise. Then we can see how quickly does ;C converge to the
boundary value, i.e. find a function 5 (C) such that lim
C→∞
;C/ 5 (C) = 1. This function
5 (C) is called the asymptotic speed of learning or ASL.
To do this analysis in full generality, for any signal distribution, seems to be a
very complex problem, so we choose a particular, well-known in the social learning
literature, pair of distribution. Consider the following distributions of private signals
for the 86ℎ and the !>F states
 (G) = G2
! (G) = 1 − (1 − G)2.
Then corresponding distributions of the likelihood ratios are
 (H) = P
(
6 (B)
6! (B)
≤ H
\ = 86ℎ) = H2(1 + H)2
! (H) = P
(
6 (B)
6! (B)
≤ H
\ = !>F) = H2 + 2H(1 + H)2 ,
for H ∈ [0,∞]. It is easy to see that this pair of distributions actually correspond to
the likelihood beliefs, as ′

(H)/′
!
(H) = 5 (H)/ 5! (H) = H(L. Smith and Sørensen,
2000).
The following theorem tells us that it is indeed profitable for the social planner
to choose prices that increase the asymptotic speed of learning. For example, if
?C > 1/2, then it is better to choose some constant price greater than 1 rather than
to stick with no price. Furthermore, in this situation it is not optimal to choose the
price that slows down the asymptotic speed, :C < 1. Also, the optimal prices are
bounded.
The fact that :C is greater than 1 and ?C > 1/2 implies that the ASL increases in :C
times.
Theorem 19. For high enough ?C there exists : > 1 such that :C = : gives a higher
utility than no price at all. Furthermore, when it is better to choose :C > 1 rather
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than :C = 1, it is not optimal to choose :C < 1. Moreover, prices are bounded: ∃
: > 0 and : < ∞ such that : < :∗C < : for the optimal :∗C .
Under some mild conditions on D′(?), we can relax the first statement “for high
enough ?C” to “for ?C > 1/2”.
This theorem does not only provide the desirable result about the increased ASL, as
formally stated in Corollary 21, but also a surprising fact: the optimal prices :C are
bounded from 0 and∞. This implies that as the public belief goes to 1, the optimal
price 2C does not go to 1 (equivalent to :C not going to∞) in order to extract a lot of
information from the action, as it is too costly.
It also implies that we can approximate the optimal outcome with a good precision
by fixing some constant price when ?C is close to the boundary values, saving the
cost of updating.
To understand why this theorem is very interesting, let us look at the big picture.
The main problem with continuous signals is that ?C has a very complex behavior,
and so the analytical solution of the utility function and hence, the optimal pricing
policy, can not be obtained.
Given that we do not know the utility function, we are still able to provide a nice
description of the optimal policy: the price should be against the belief, i.e. if
?C > 1/2, then :C > 1, some constant pricing will already give us more utility then
no prices at all, and these prices are bounded. As we will see in the next section,
where we calculate D(?) and the optimal :∗C numerically, this is indeed a very good
description of the optimal policy.
There are two main corollaries of Theorem 19. The first one is that the full learning
occurs.
Corollary 20. As C goes to infinity, ?C converges to 1 if \ = 86ℎ and to 0 if
\ = !>F.
For the second one, notice that Theorem 19 tells us that from some point on, the
optimal price, :C , is above 1. If it stays above some : > 1, which we will see, in the
next section is true, then the ASL is going to increase at least by factor : .
Corollary 21. If the social planner chooses a constant price :C = : > 1 and
\ = 86ℎ, then the asymptotic speed of learning increases by a factor : .
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Therefore, prices indeed increase the social welfare and the ASL at the same time.
In the next section, we try a different approach to solve for the utility function D and
the optimal pricing policy.
3.4 Numerical calculations
As we saw above, all theoretical calculations are already fairly complicated and it
seems impossible to obtain the analytical solution for (3.1). Thus, we are going to
provide a numerical solution of (3.1), which reaffirms claims and intuitions that we
had before.
Again, suppose that conditional on the underlying state, the private likelihood ratio
has CDF either  (H) or ! (H) as in previous subsection and X = 0.9
 (H) =
H2
(1 + H)2
! (H) =
H2 + 2H
(1 + H)2
·
We are going to look for a solution of the following form
D̃(?) =
<∑
8=1
C8) (8, ?),
where C8 are constants and ) (8, ?) is 8’s Chebyshev polynomial of the first kind.
To remind readers, ) (0, ?) = 1, ) (1, ?) = ?, ) (2, ?) = 2?2 − 1, and ) (:, ?) =
2?) (: − 1, ?) − ) (: − 2, ?).
What we need to do is to find these constants, C8’s. This is done by a collocation
method (“Collocation method” n.d.). The corresponding coefficients are
(C8)98=0 = (136.6,−250.2, 195.8543,−129.0, 70.4,−30.9, 10.4,−2.4, 0.3, 0).
The graph of D̃ is presented in Figure 3.4.
Let us check that this is a good approximation. To do so, we calculate the right
hand side of (3.1) given D̃(?) and compare the maximal distance between these two
functions. It is equal to 8.3 · 10−4 which is extremely small.
Moreover, we can now see that as public belief approaches 1, optimal :C increases
and is significantly above 1. Here are a few examples
Here, ?(2C) is the modified public belief.
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Figure 3.4: Approximation of the utility function with the optimal pricing, D(?).
?C 2C :C ?C (2C)
0.7 0.12 1.26 0.64
0.8 0.2 1.49 0.73
0.9 0.32 1.94 0.82
0.95 0.4 2.37 0.89
0.99 0.5 3.04 0.97
0.999 0.53 3.28 0.996
Table 3.1: Optimal price and modified public belief given current public belief
We can also calculate the expected utility without any price in a similar way. Let
us denote it by D:=1(?). Then, for X = 0.9, the difference in expected utilities as
a percentage of 1 − D:=1(?) is around 10%. The reason we are normalizing by
1 − D:=1(?) and not by 1 or D:=1(?) is that this formula better captures how the
expected utility functions flatten. In otherwords, it becomesmore convex comparing
to a 45 degree cone (D:=1(?)) that we have when there is no price.
This difference may not be as dramatic as one would think. The reason for this is
that we apply a significant non-zero price (:C ≠ 1) for high public beliefs, which
results in utility gain. In order to bring back this utility growth to ?C = 1/2 from
those high public beliefs, we need to take a large number of steps. Thus, the gain is
significantly discounted. We can observe bigger improvements when we take higher
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values of X.
This means that the optimal prices significantly increase the asymptotic speed of
learning as well as the social welfare.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we improve the main inefficiencies of the classical sequential learning
model. We introduce a social planner whose objective is to maximize the social
welfare of the agents by choosing the optimal prices for the new good in each period.
We show that the optimal prices indeed increase the social welfare as well as have
other positive effects on the public belief. In the case of bounded signals, society
ends up with a much higher public belief than in the classical case, and for the
unbounded case, it significantly increases the convergence speed.
We manage to provide a complete characterization of the utility function and the
optimal strategy in the binary case. Even though calculations are very complex
for general distributions of private signals, we provide the main properties and
description of both the expected utility function and the optimal strategy for a
specific continuous distribution. For example, the new product should cost more
than the old one if the former one is believed to be better. Furthermore, when the
public belief goes to its extreme value (1 or 0), the optimal price is bounded by a
constant.
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C h a p t e r 4
WEAK AND STRONG TIES IN SOCIAL NETWORK
Many studies find (Jackson, 2007), (Jackson, 2011) that networks are important
vehicles for passing information in various economic situations. As nowadays
information is one of the most valuable resources, a deeper understanding of how
it travels through the network can significantly benefit different aspects of our life.
They range from career advancement to finding likeminded people and improving
the quality of our leisure time.
As we know from our daily life experience, in social networks there are more than
just two relationship states between people.1 Different types of these ties between
individuals have different effects. In this paper, we assume that there are three
main types of connections. People might not know each other, however, if they
do, there are two possibilities: they can be distant acquaintances or close friends.
The question that we ask is: how do these various connections shape the network
between individuals?
Social networks are known for delivering various types of information. One of the
prime examples of this is learning about a job opening from someone in your social
circle. According to a recent survey (Adler, 2016) published by LinkedIn, around
85% of all jobs are filled via networking. So a question arises: when searching for
a job, should we rely more on our group of friends or acquaintances? What roles do
these groups play in providing agents with informational opportunities?
In this paper, we study a two-stage model: first, agents strategically form a network;
second, a piece of information, e.g. about a new job oppening, is planted in the
network and is spread there for the next 2 time periods. Each player gets utility
1 if the information reaches her and 0 otherwise. Society is divided into villages:
people within the same village have an opportunity to be friends with each other
and players in different villages have an opportunity to be acquaintances. It is a
real-life observation of the fact that it is easier to maintain a friendship with someone
who is geographically, or in some other sense, close to you. Agents play a network
formation game, where they choose how much effort, e.g. amount of time, they
want to put into socializing with other people to connect to them. Both agents need
1Whether they know or do not know each other.
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to exert a non-zero effort in order for them to have a chance to become connected.
Once the network has been realized, people have to pay different costs to sustain
two types of relationships. Friendship is more difficult to maintain but it is a more
reliable source of information compared to acquaintanceship. After the agents have
made their decisions, the network emerges and defines links between people. In
the second stage, a random person in the network receives a piece of valuable
information, and we allow this information to travel through the network for two
periods.
In the case when information travels only for 1 period, the game becomes trivial. For
the two types of connections, onewill bemore beneficial than the other in terms of the
difference between the associated utility and the cost. Thus, agents will choose the
more valuable one and completely disregard the other type of link. In other words,
you should have only friends or only acquaintances. Also, the seminal paper by
Granovetter (Granovetter, 1977) states that most job offers come from acquaintances
(also called “weak ties”) rather than from friends (“strong ties”). This phenomenon
is called “strength of weak ties” and many papers (Contandriopoulos et al., 2016),
(Weng et al., 2018) argue that they are significantly more helpful than the strong
connections. We know from the sociological literature that social ties effect our
well-being (Haythornthwaite. and B. Haythornthwaite, 1998), (C. Haythornthwaite
and Wellman, 1990), (Sandstrom and Dunn, 2014), (Holt-Lunstad, T. Smith, and
Layton, 2010). But why do we observe both types of connections in real life from
economic stand point? Should we keep both strong and weak links or should we
disregard one of them?
We believe the answer lies within the network’s topology. In equilibrium, and in
real-life, if  and  are both friends with , then they are more likely to have a
link between each other rather than if they were both ’s acquaintances. It means
that the friends’ graph is denser compared to the acquaintances’ one. This leads to
the following intuition for observing both types of connections in real-life networks.
An agent does not want to spend her whole budget on the strong ties as, at some
point, a new friend is not going to bring many players into her network because of
the high clustering2 of the friends’ graph. On the other hand, a new acquaintance
will indirectly connect her to many people whom she does not know yet because
their graph is sparser. At the same time, not having any friends is not optimal
either, because in this case an agent can trade some weak ties for a few reliable
2Informally, clustering coefficient, or just clustering, says how likely two people who have a
common friend/acquaintance know each other.
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strong ones which, at this point, would not suffer from an aforementioned high
clustering. However, the primary reason for observing both types of connections is
the following. The main part of the agent’s network (which brings the most utility)
is constituted of weak-strong and strong-weak ties which combine the best of both
worlds: 1) they are reliable as they include a strong tie, and 2) they bring information
from diverse sources as they include a weak tie. Therefore, in order for agents to
maximize their utility, which requires having weak-strong and strong-weak links
present in equilibrium, individuals need to have both types of connections.
In this paper, we establish that a non-trivial symmetric Nash equilibrium can only
be in a neighborhood of the Y-equilibrium of this game. In both these equilibria, it is
the best response for people to have both friends and acquaintances at the same time.
This explains why we observe both types of connections between individuals. We
find that a bulk of agent’s utility comes from weak-strong, strong-weak, and weak-
weak connections, and as a result, agents always want to have these ties present
in their network. We also perform multiple comparative statics of this equilibrium
and check whether the friends’ graph has a higher clustering coefficient than the
acquaintances’ one. Finally, we compare it to the optimal symmetric network and
find that there are more strong ties in the latter one. People underinvest in their
strong connections in the equilibrium. This suggests that if a social planner would
“subsidize” the strong ties or “tax” the weak ones it would increase social welfare.
The intuition for this is that it is socially beneficial not only to get the signal but also
to share it with others through reliable strong connections.
The paper is organized in the following way. In the next section, we present
our model and explain its different mechanics and properties. In the second one,
we present the analytical findings that we described above. Next, we provide
some computational results and graphs to confirm that our solution/equilibrium is
a plausible approximation of the social networks that we observe. We conclude in
the final chapter.
Literature review
In a seminal paper by Granovetter (Granovetter, 1977) the author describes a sur-
prising finding of his field experiment: people find a new job through weak ties
more often than from the strong ones (27% vs 16%). Many studies agree with Gra-
novetter’s opinion. Contandriopoulos et. al (Contandriopoulos et al., 2016) claims
that it is significantly more valuable to play a “bridge" role in the network. This
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corresponds to having weak ties rather than “redundant” strong links: a researcher
could gain up to one h-index point by making 3 weak connections. Furthermore,
Weng et. al (Weng et al., 2018) find evidence that weak ties are used to collect
“important” information.
There are empirical papers that address the ties’ strength and their ability to help
find a new job. Gee and et. al (Gee et al., 2017) construct a very large data set of
deidentified individuals from 55 countries. They find that even though it is more
likely to hear about a job opening from a week tie, the likelihood of working at a
place where your friend/acquaintance works is increasing with the strength of your
connection.
Furthermore, Kuzubas and Szabo (Kuzubas and Szabo, 2017) find that in Indonesia,
people tend to use their strong ties more than the weak ones when the number of
the latter ones is either on a small or on a large side of the range. At the same time,
even with a medium-sized weak network, the probability of getting a job through
a strong tie decreases by only 16%. However, positions found through weak links
correspond to 10% higher wages.
In terms of theoretical work, there are fewer papers in this area. Golub and
Livne (Golub and Livne, 2010) study how different levels of agent’s neighbor-
hoods affect the equilibrium network. They have a similar insight to ours, that
player’s utility does not only depend on her friends, but also, her friends of friends.
The authors find, there are two equilibrium regimes in which the realized network
can be either connected or fragmented when the costs are not too convex. However,
they do not consider different types of connections that we observe in real life.
Boorman (Boorman, 1975) tries to capture the trade-off between strong and weak
ties. One of his main results is that, depending on the probability of being unem-
ployed, all-weak and all-strong networks are going to be equilibrium. The author
assumes that there is no clustering not only in the acquaintances’ network, but also
in the friends one, which is a very unrealistic assumption. Furthermore, it seems
that he does not take into account the agent’s neighborhoods at a distance of more
than 1, which we believe plays a crucial role in a deeper understanding of network
effects.
Tümen (Tümen, 2017) claims that different types of links are used in different
periods of our life. He connects weak links with an early career stable settlement
while strong ties are associated with the amplified mobility that generates mismatch.
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4.1 Model
In this paper, we study the following two-stage model: in the first stage, agents
strategically form a network, and in the second stage, information spreads and
defines the agents’ utilities. We will start with the second stage.
There is a network of people with two different types of connections between each
other. We represent it by an undirected graph (+, ), where+ is a set of vertices and
 is a set of edges. We write  as the disjoint union of B, the set of strong ties, and
F, the set of weak ties. For 8, 9 ∈ + , let 3 (8, 9) denote the length of the shorterst
path between 8 and 9 .3 Note that 3 (8, 9) = 3 ( 9 , 8), as the graph is undirected. We
denote by #: (8) the neighborhood of agent 8 at distance : , which is a set of agents
that are exactly at distance : from 8:
#: (8) = { 9 ∈ + | 3 (8, 9) = :}.
Recall that a clustering coefficient () of a graph is defined as
 =
3 × number of triangles
number of all triplets
,
where the number of triangles is the number of unordered triplets (, , ), , ,  ∈
+ such that there exists an edge between any pair from them.
In period 1, nature randomly selects a person 8 who receives a signal/piece of
valuable information. In the first period, this player sends information to all of her
friends and acquaintances. It travels through a strong tie with probability 1 and
through a weak one with probability cF 4. In the second period, everyone who has
received the signal from agent 8 sends it to their friends and acquaintances in the
same way. If this information reaches a player in at least one of these two periods,
then her utility is 1, and 0 otherwise.
We now define the first stage when agents form the underlying network, (+, ).
Society is divided into # + 1 “villages”, with  agents in each one. People in the
same village can potentially be friends with each other and players in different ones
can potentially be acquaintances.
For each player 9 ≠ 8, agent 8 chooses an effort level, 1 ≥ ?8 9 ≥ 0, that she is
willing to spend to become his friend or acquaintance, depending on whether they
3A path between two nodes, 8, 9 ∈ + , is a sequence of nodes =1, =2, . . . =C ∈ + , such that =1 = 8,
=C = 9 , and ∀ 8 ∈ {1, . . . C − 1} 4=8=8+1 ∈  .
4So with probability 1 − cF information does not reach the other end of the week link.
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are in the same village or not. Thus, a strategy for player 8 are effort levels for all
other players, {?8 9 } ∀ 9 ∈ + \ {8}. We are going to focus on symmetric strategies:
agent chooses one effort level for people in her own village and another level for
people outside of it. Thus, a strategy for player 8 simplifies to {?8, @8}, where ?8
is a socialization level within the village and @8 is a socialization level outside of
it. After the strategies have been chosen, two agents 8 and 9 , who are in the same
village, become friends with probability ?8? 9 and, if they are in different villages,
they become acquaintances with probability @8@ 9 .
Maintainting each strong and each weak link requires 2BCA>=6 and 2F40: units of
time, respectively. People have a time budget, , that they can spend on their social
circle. Their utility vanishes if they exceed the budget and does not depend on
2BCA>=6 and 2F40: otherwise. To simplify our presentation in the following sections,
we normalize 2BCA>=6 to be 1 and allow 2F40: and cF to vary.
Here is a description of the game. Agent 8, who is in a village V8, chooses her
effort levels 1 ≥ ?8, @8 ≥ 0 and becomes friends with player 9 ∈ V8 with probability
?8? 9 and she becomes acquainted with player ℓ ∉ V8 with probability @8@ℓ. Agent 8
maximizes her expected utility*# , where # stands for the number of villages other
than hers, given by this expression:
*# (?8, @8, ?−8, @−8) =

E(+,) (P(8 gets the signal)) ,
if 2BCA>=6?8
∑
9∈V8
9≠8
? 9 + 2F40:@8
∑
ℓ∉V8
@ℓ ≤ 
0,
otherwise,
where {?−8, @−8} stand for a strategy profile of every player except 8 and we are
taking expectation over realizations of the random graph.
We are going to focus on symmetric equilibria, ?8 = ? and @8 = @ ∀ 8. There are two
trivial equilibria: 1) ∀ 8 ?8 = 0; 2) ∀ 8 @8 = 0. If everyone else is not exerting any
effort for one type of connections, then it is strictly dominated for player 8 as well to
choose a non-zero effort level for it. Whichever strategy player 8 chooses, this type
of connection is not going to realize as the probability of it is the product of effort
levels.
But as soon as ? and @ for other players are positive, agent 8 is going to choose ?8
and @8 such that she uses all of the budget that is available to her, . Otherwise,
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she can increase one of her effort levels and benefit from increasing the expected
number of her connections. Therefore, we can treat this objective as if we have
equality in the budget constraint.
From now on, we refer to nontrivial symmetric equilibria as equilibria unless stated
otherwise. In the next section, we prove that an equilibrium is in a neighborhood
of the unqiue Y-equilibrium of this game. We investigate their properties, including
multiple comparative statics and welfare results.
4.2 Analytical results
We start our analysis by noting that the probability the signal reaches agent 8 can
depend on the realized graph in a very complex way. As a simple example, consider
the case when there are only twoweak-strong paths between 8 and 9 and the latter one
is given the signal by nature. Then, the probability that it reaches 8 is 1− (1−cF)2 =
2cF − c2F, instead of cF if there was only one path. Fortunately, as we increase the
number of villages, # + 1, the chance that there are multiple connections between
8 and some other person 9 , that include at least one weak link, vanishes. This fact
allows us to find a limit utility function *∞ such that *# uniformly converges to it
as we increase # + 1.
We are going to prove that when agents are maximizing*∞ instead of*# , there is a
unique equilibrium, and as a result of this, there are equilibria of the initial function
within the Y-neighborhood of it. Furthermore, there are no equilibria of the initial
function that are not in a neighborhood of some equilibrium of *∞. Moreover, it is
clear to see that this equilibrium of the limit utility function is also an Y-equilibrium
of the initial game. Let us first explain how we find this limit utility function, and
then write it down explicitly.
Notice that when there are no overlaps in paths, that we described above (of length at
most 2, which have at least one weak link in them), there are only 5 groups of people
in our5 social circle that affect our utility. We describe each group by the type of the
shortest path between us: strong, weak, strong-strong, weak-strong and strong-weak
(together in one group), weak-weak. Let us multiply the number of people in the
weak, strong-weak and weak-strong groups by cF, and the number of people in the
weak-weak group by c2F 6. If we now add the number of people in every group (after
three of them have been normalized by cF and c2F in the previous sentence) and
5We use “our" and 8’s interchangeably.
6As these are the probabilities that a signal reaches player 8 through each of these paths.
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add 1 (to include ourselves), then this sum, divided by the total number of people in
society, is equal to the probability that the signal reaches us. Thus, by choosing ?8,
@8 that maximize this number player 8 maximizes her utility. This happens because:
1) every individual is equally likely to be chosen by nature; 2) the signal travels for
2 time periods, and 3) there are no overlaps in paths of length 1 or 2, containing at
least one weak tie, between us and some other player.
In Proposition 43, we evaluate how many people player 8 expects to have in each of
these 5 groups. Denote the number of people in all those groups, some of which are
normalized by cF and c2F correspondingly, by *̃#
*̃# (?8, @8, ?, @) =
(
1 + ( − 1)?8? + cF #@8@ + ( − 1) (1 − ?8?)×
× (1 − (1 − ?8?3) −2) + cF ( − 1)#
(
?8?@
2 + ?2@8@
)
+
+ c2F@8@3 2#2
)
The second and the third terms of *̃# calculate how many strong and weak ties we
have at distance 1. The next two terms are a bit more complicated. The fourth term
stands for the number of friends of friends that are not our direct friends. The fifth
one calculates the number of people that are at distance 2 such that there is either a
weak-strong or strong-weak path between us. The last term calculates the number
of people that are at distance 2 from us, connected through a weak-weak path7. The
1 stands for the agent 8 herself. We need to multiply the second and the last two
terms by cF and c2F, respectively, because information travels through a weak tie
with probability cF. So, for example, the expected utility from a group of weak
links is proportional to the number of them,  #@8@, multiplied by cF.
Our *̃# is a polynomial of two variables, ?8, @8 (keeping ? and @ fixed) that we need
to maximize with respect to ?8 and @8 subject to the budget constraint and symmetric
equilibrium assumption (?8 = ?, @8 = @). Notice that even though its order is fairly
high, it does not depend on # . It is optimal for agent 8 to choose ?8 and @8 such
that her budget constraint is satisfied with equality. Thus, we can use this equation
to write @8 (and @ after applying a symmetric strategy assumption) in terms of ?8
(?), and then substitute it back into *̃# so it becomes a polynomial of one variable
7We multiply the number of weak-weak connections by #/(# − 1) which converges to 1 as we
increase # .
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*̃# (?8, @8 (?8), ?, @(?)). Keep in mind, that even after we do this, it is still tricky
in general to get analytical results about a maximum of a high order polynomial,
especially on [0, 1]. But before we proceed, we need to introduce some notations
to make formulas more readable and intuitive.
Denote by "BCA>=6 and "F40: the following quantities
"BCA>=6 =

( − 1)
"F40: =

 #2F40:
·
(4.1)
These quantities come from ( − 1)?8? +  #@8@2F40: = , where we replaced
2BCA>=6 with 1. Because all effort levels are non-negative, "BCA>=6 and "F40: are
the upper bounds for ?8? and @8@, respectively. These bounds are achieved when
the probability of having another type of connection is equal to 0. So, if player
8 decides not to have any acquaintances, @8 = 0, then ?8? = "BCA>=6 and she has
"BCA>=6 ( − 1) friends in expectation. Similarly, if she decides not to have any
friends, ?8 = 0, then @8@ = "F40: and she is going to have "F40: # weak links in
expectation. But the most helpful part of this notation is that we can express @8@ in
terms of ?8? in a short form as @8@ = "F40: − ( −1) #2F40: ?8?.
Now, if we substitute @8@ in *̃# using the equation above, we get the limit utility
function*∞
*∞ = 1 + ( − 1)?8? +
cF
2F40:
( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − ?8?) + ( − 1) (1 − ?8?)×
× (1 − (1 − ?8?3) −2) +
cF
2F40:
( − 1)2
(
?8?("BCA>=6 − ?2) + ?2×
× ("BCA>=6 − ?8?)
)
+
c2F
22
F40:
("BCA>=6 − ?8?) ("BCA>=6 − ?2) ( − 1)2.
As we can see, *∞ does not actually depend on # , which conforms with its name.
Denote by ?∞ an equilibrium (trivial or non trivial) of*∞ and by ?# an equilibrium
of *# . We show that *# uniformly converges to *∞. This, in its turn, implies that
for any ?∞, there is a ?# within the Y-neighborhood of it, and vice versa.
Proposition 22. For any Y > 0 ∃ #̄ such that ∀# > #̄ and any fixed  
|*∞(?8, @8, ?, @) −*# (?8, @8, ?, @) | < Y.
48
Furthermore, ∀ Y > 0 ∃ #̄ such that ∀# > #̄ and for any equilibrium of *∞, ?∞,
there exists an equilibrium of*# , ?# , within the Y-neighborhood of ?∞. Moreover,
there are not any equilibria of*# outside of those neighborhoods.
From now on, we are going to assume that the agents’ utilities are represented by
the latter one, study the corresponding equilibria, and then connect them back to the
ones of the initial function. Replacing*# with*∞ leads to the following objective
function of player 8:
max
?8
(
1 + ( − 1)?8? +
cF
2F40:
( − 1) (" − ?8?) + ( − 1) (1 − ?8?)×
× (1 − (1 − ?8?3) −2) +
cF
2F40:
( − 1)2×
×
(
?8?(" − ?2) + ?2(" − ?8?)
)
+
c2F
22
F40:
(" − ?8?) (" − ?2) ( − 1)2
)
subject to: ( − 1)?8? +  #@8@ 2F40: = ,
1 ≥ ?8 ≥ 0,
1 ≥ @8 ≥ 0.
Remember that in order to find symmetric equilibria, we need to find solutions to
(m*∞/m?8)

?8=?
= 0. We already mentioned that there are two trivial equilibria.
The first main result that we have is that there is only one non-trivial symmetric Nash
equilibrium of*∞, which we call ?∗. It is also an Y-equilibrium of the initial game.8
As a consequence of this and the previous proposition, there is an equilibrium of
the initial utility function,*# , in Y-neighborhood of ?∗.
Theorem 23. There is a unique equilibrium of*∞, ?∗, if:
• cF
2F40:
< 1
• cF
2F40:
> 4
− 
2 ( −3)
( −1)2
(
1 − 
 −1
)
Otherwise, there are only trivial equilibria.
Because there are more potential acquaintances available (# ) than friends ( −1),
we expect that the latter graph will be more clustered than the first one. This leads
8We leave this as an exercise.
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to the following trade-off. When choosing between having another strong or weak
tie, agents need to take two things into account: 1) how much utility does a new
connection bring at distance 1 and 2) how much does it bring at distance 2. The first
one asks about the relationship between 2BCA>=6, 2F40: , and cF to determine which
type of link is more appealing if we were only getting utility from our direct ties
(the ones that are at distance 1). The second one, more subtle, asks how many new
connections does the new tie bring to our current neighborhood.
For example, if it is more beneficial at distance 1 to have a friend, we still might not
want to spend all our time on the strong ties. Because, at some point, our friends’
graph will be so clustered that a new strong connection will not significantly change
our neighborhood9, i.e. friends of my new friend are likely to be either my friends
or friends of my friends already. Therefore, it is more beneficial to trade this new
strong connection for a few weak ones, which will increase our utility by indirectly
connecting us to people we do not know yet.10 Alternatively, consider the case when
we only have acquaintances and assume that we trade some of them for a few friends.
The friends’ graph is sparse at this point11 so there is no clustering disadvantage
that was described above. Furthermore, not only strong links are more beneficial
at distance 1, but they also give us access to their own friends and acquaintances
through a very reliable connection. So it is not optimal to have only one type of link
in the equilibrium.
The uniqueness of a non-trivial equilibrium is a nice result as there is no ambiguity
about which outcome is going to be implemented by society. This theorem tells
us that unless the price for maintaining weak connections is extreme, we should
observe both, weak and strong, connections between people.
Two constraints above are necessary for the existence of a nontrivial equilibrium. The
first condition ensures that the equilibrium function, m*∞/m?8

?8=?
is nonnegative
around ? = 0. The second one, on the other hand, makes sure that it becomes
negative at some point on [0,
√
"BCA>=6]. Therefore, m*∞/m?8

?8=?
crosses 0, as it
is continuous.
But there is more to these constraints than the technical explanations. If 2F40: is
smaller than cF, then there are only trivial equilibrium solutions. The reason why
the nontrivial one disappears is that weak connections are not only more appealing
9And, as a consequence, our expected utility.
10Because the acquaintances’ graph is sparser than the friends’ one.
11We do not have any friends yet, so from our point of view it is sparse/there is no clustering.
50
at distance 2 as their graph is more disperse, hence they can potentially bring in
more people in our network, but they are also very beneficial at distance 1. A direct
benefit from a friend is 1− 2BCA>=6 = 0 and from an acquaintance is cF − 2F40: > 0.
So in a case when cF/2F40: > 1, it is rational to disregard strong connections and
focus only on the weak ones.
Now let us look at the second constraint. Let us fix the left-hand side and change
 first. When  is significantly big, the friends’ graph becomes very sparse
as the village gets larger, and the right-hand side of the constraint approaches 1.
This requires 2F40: to be close to cF to make weak connections more attractive.
Otherwise, we prefer to spend our budget only on friends. Which leads to the other
trivial equilibrium. The same thing occurs if  is small. However, if we do have a
lot of time,  is large, then the right-hand side decreases, which relaxes the bound
on 2F40: and allows it to be bigger. When we have a lot of time, keeping 2F40: fixed,
our friends’ graph will become very clustered at some point and we would like to
have a few acquaintances to maximize the effective size of our neighborhood.
The second part of Theorem 23 validates our choice of the approximation function.
It shows that there is a nontrivial symmetric initial equilibrium (possibly multiple
ones) within Y-neighborhood of the approximate equilibrium. Thus, we can learn
about its behavior by analysing ?∗.
While proving this proposition, we find that weak-strong, strong-weak, and weak-
weak ties constitute the bulk of agent’s utility. It does make sense if we think about it.
Imagine that you are looking for a job at Google and you happen to know someone
who works there. Why is this connection valuable to you? Is it because exactly
this person is going to offer you a job? This is very unlikely. But she has many
colleagues and one of them might give you an offer after she recommends you to
him. So it makes a lot of sense to look at the number and the types of connections
we have not only at distance 1, but also at distance 2.
Let us now analyze this approximate equilibrium ?∗ and see what happens to it as
we change the parameters of the game. Does ?∗ increase when we increase the cost
of maintaining weak ties, 2F40: , or increase the number of people in the village,  ?
For this, we have the following comparative statics result.
Proposition 24. As we do one of the following:
• increase the cost of weak ties, 2F40: ;
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• decrease the probability of information traveling through a weak tie, cF;
• decrease the number of people in the village,  ,
then the equilibrium effort level for making friends, ?∗, increases.
The first two cases are very intuitive: as we make a weak tie option more attractive,
we trade some of our friends for acquaintances as we decrease ?∗ and, hence,
decrease the expected number of strong ties. But the last case, when we change  ,
seems more interesting in some sense. We have some fixed time budget that we
can spend on our connections, so increase in  implies that the upper bound on ?,
"BCA>=6, has to decrease. So it is not surprising that the equilibrium value ?∗ also
decreases. However, the expected number of friends increases when we increase  
as we will show in the next section.
Let us give an intuition for this result. Remember that Erdős - Rényi random graphs
look like trees for small values of ? and are significantly clustered for large values.
If the latter one occurs, we have this trade-off between strong and weak ties: strong
ties might give you higher utility at distance 1, but are more redundant at distance 2
because of the clustering. When we increase  , "BCA>=6 decreases which forces ?
to stay small enough so that the friends’ graph does not get very clustered. Hence,
the strong ties are more attractive than they were before because now they do not
have (or have less) disadvantage at distance 2: they are also fairly sparse and bring
more diverse information from distance 2. This is why the expected number of
friends increases: ?∗2 does decrease but not as fast as  increases, so their product,
( − 1)?∗2 , increases.
There are twomore questions that we want to answer in this section. First, in equilib-
rium, is friends’ graph more clustered than the acquaintances’ graph? Second, how
does the socially optimal symmetric network differ from the equilibrium network?
Should we have more friends or acquaintances to maximize the social welfare?
Let us start with the former one. We talked about the trade-off that we observe
in this model: how much utility each type of links gives us at distance 1 vs how
much it brings at distance 2 (how clustered is the graph for this connection type).
We assumed that the friends’ graph is more clustered than the acquaintances’ one.
But we did not, technically, force the  for the former graph to be higher than the
 for the latter one. The following lemma makes sure that in the equilibrium, the
friends’ network is indeed more clustered.
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Lemma 25. If 2F40: > cF −1 +
( −1) (+1)
 (−1)# , then the clustering coefficient of the
acquaintances’ graph is smaller than the  of the friends’ graph.
Thus, when 2F40: is a bit bigger than its general bound, cF (from Theorem 23),
friends’ graph is indeed more clustered. This tells us that our equilibrium graph
mimics a very essential property of the real life networks.
Now that we have a good idea of how our equilibrium looks like and behaves,
we can compare it with another network, the socially optimal one. To elaborate:
what would be a socially efficient symmetric random network if we could tell
people what strategy to play? In mathematical terms, what if we apply symmetry
to *∞(?8, @8 (?8), ?, @)

?8=?
and then maximize it with respect to ?? Would we
have more acquaintances or friends compared to the equilibrium graph? Would
the new graph look very different from the equilibrium network? We have a very
interesting result that the former one is not going to be dramatically different (solution
probabilities and the equilibrium functions are going to be similar), but we are going
to have more friends than in the latter one. So in a utopian world, where everyone
can coordinate what to do, people should have more friends than in the equilibrium.
Theorem 26. Let ?>?C8<0; be a solution to*′∞(?, @(?), ?, @(?)) = 0. If there exists
an equilibrium ?∗ and
• cF/2F40: ≥ (1 − ?∗
4) −2,
then ?>?C8<0; > ?∗. In other words, there are more friends in the optimal network
than in the equilibrium one.
The intuition for this result is that if we want to maximize social welfare, we not only
care about getting the signal, but also about sharing it with others, and the strong
ties are more reliable sources of information.
This completes our analytical analysis and in the next section, we are going to
present some graphs and quantitative results for the equilibrium.
4.3 Quantitative results
In this section, we show a few more interesting properties of the equilibrium and
provide graphs for visualisation purpose.
We start with a graph of how many connections of different types people have in
equilibrium, Figure 4.1. Recall that we fixed 2BCA>=6 to be equal to 1 and vary cF,
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2F40: . As we saw in the last section, we care about their relative value towards each
other. Let us fix cF = 0.4 and vary 2F40: .
Figure 4.1: Number of different ties (normalized appropriately by cF or c2F) people
have in equilibrium when  = 20, # = 100, 2BCA>=6 = 1, cF = 0.4, 2F40: ∈
(0.45, 1.55).
Theorem 23 tells us that 2F40: has to be bigger than cF, so we choose 2F40: -axis to
be from 0.5 to 1.5.
As we can see, weak-strong and strong-weak ties (multiplied by cF) correspond to
the bulk of all agent’s connections. Hence, they constitute the most utility out of
all other types of connections. To have weak-strong and strong-weak connections
present in the network, agents have to have a positive number of both weak and
strong individual ties. This gives an explanation why we observe both types of
connections in a real life, even though it might look unintiuitive at first.
The second biggest contributors to agent’s utility are either weak-weak or strong-
strong connections depending on the parameters of the model. As we see, most
of agent’s utility comes not from her direct links but from the indirect ones, which
makes sense if we recall an example with Google’s job offer after Theorem 23.
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Notice how the number of friends vanishes when 2F40: becomes closer to cF and we
approach a trivial equilibrium. It appears almost impossible to not satisfy the other
constraint (when the weak connections disappear in equilibrium) of Theorem 23 as
2F40: would have to be bigger than 209 (keeping other parameters the same).
The second property that we would like to show is mentioned after the Proposi-
tions 24. We proved that as we increase the number of people in each village,  ,
the equilibrium probability of making a new friend, ?∗2 , decreases. However, the
number of friends that an agent ends up having in equilibrium increases. Figure 4.2
illustrates these results.
Figure 4.2: Value of ?∗2 as we change the number of people in the village,  .
As we said before, ?2 intuitively should decrease because its upped bound, "BCA>=6,
decreases when  increases. But the former one does not do it quickly enough
relatively to the increase in  and, as a result of this, their product, ( − 1)?∗2 ,
increases.
When we increase the number of people in the village, keeping the budget fixed,
the friends graph becomes sparser. Therefore, strong links have less disadvantage
at distance 2. This motivates people to trade some of their acquaintances for new
friends.
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The last graph we would like to present compares the equilibrium and the optimal
networks. In Theorem 26, we proved that it is socially optimal for all agents to
increase the number of friends. In Figure 4.3, we can see that ?>?C8<0; is indeed
bigger than ?∗. Interestingly, these values are very close to each other, so our
equilibrium network does not differ a lot from the optimal one. This implies that
society on its own can achieve a fairly efficient outcome without any interference
from the social planner. This very positive result concludes our analysis.
Figure 4.3: Value of ?∗2 in the equilibrium and optimal networks as we change the
cost of weak ties, 2F40: .
4.4 Conclusion
In this study, we find necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a non-
trivial equilibrium in which players choose both weak and strong ties. The reason
why it is optimal for agents to choose both types of connections is because the
bulk of their utility comes from weak-strong and strong-weak ties, which require
positive amounts of both types of links to be present in the network. This provides
an explanation for why we observe strong and weak ties in real life at the same
time even though it might seem unintuitive at first. In the equilibrium (under a
mild condition), the friends’ graph is more clustered than the acquaintances’ one,
which complies with empirical evidence. We also provide comparative statics of
the equilibrium.
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Furthermore, we compare the equilibrium network with the socially optimal sym-
metric one. These networks are surprisingly similar, but in the latter, agents have
more friends. Intuitively, when maximizing social welfare, agents care not only
about receiving the information, but also sharing it with others. And the strong ties
are more reliable in this case.
We would also like to note another aspect of this work. There are two main types of
network models. The first one works with random graphs to represent society and
ties between people. Whereas the second one uses game theory to make sure every
link is consensual by both sides. Models of the latter type often require either a
lot of symmetry from the network or simplifying assumptions due to very complex
combinatorics issues. They also produce multiple equilibria, some of which do not
look realistic form a network perspective. At the same time, the network does not
appear completely randomly, but depends on agents’ decisions and choices. In this
paper, similar to Golub and Livne in (Golub and Livne, 2010), we are bringing
these two approaches together as well as forming a bridge between sociological and
economic literature.
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A p p e n d i x A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
A.1 Sub-linear learning
Before proving our main theorems we make the observation (which has appeared
before, e.g., (Chamley, 2004)) that the log-likelihood ratio of the log-likelihood ratio
is the log-likelihood ratio. Formally, if a+ and a− are the conditional distributions
of the private log-likelihood ratio !C (i.e., have CDFs + and −), then
log
da+
da−
(G) = G.
It follows that
+(G) =
∫ G
−∞
da+(Z) =
∫ G
−∞
eZ da−(Z). (A.1)
Our first lemma shows that asymptotically, + behaves like the left tail of −, and
− behaves like the right tail of +.
Lemma 27.
lim
G→∞
+(G)
−(−G)
= 1 and lim
G→−∞
−(G)
+(−G) − 1
= 1.
Proof. By definition,
+(G) = log
1 − +(−G)
1 − −(−G)
.
Since log(1 − I) = −I +$ (I2), it holds for all G large enough that
+(G) > −(−G) − 2 · +(−G).
Applying (A.1) yields
+(G) >
∫ −G
−∞
(1 − 2eZ ) da−(Z),
and so for any Y and all G large enough,
+(G) > (1 − n) ·
∫ −G
−∞
da−(Z) = (1 − n)−(−G).
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Using the same approximation of the logarithm, we have that
+(G) < (1 + n)−(−G) − +(−G) < (1 + n)−(−G).
The statement for + now follows by taking Y to zero. The corresponding bounds
on − follow by identical arguments.
Proof of Theorem 1. Condition on \ = +1. Then ℓC is with probability 1 positive
from some point on, and all agents take action +1 from this point on. Hence, for all
C large enough,
ℓC+1 = ℓC + +(ℓC).
By Lemma 27, we know that limG +(G) = 0. Hence for every n > 0 and all C large
enough, |ℓC+1 − ℓC | < n . It follows that the limit limC ℓC/C = 0. The analysis of the
case \ = −1 is identical.
Proof of Theorem 2. Given AC , we will construct private signal distributions such
that lim infC |ℓC |/AC > 0 with probability one. These distributions will furthermore
have the property that +(G) = −−(−G). As a consequence we have that regardless
of the action chosen by the agent, as long as the sign of the action is equal to that of
ℓC (which happens from some point on w.p. 1),
|ℓC+1 | = |ℓC | + +( |ℓC |).
Intuitively, if we can choose private signal distributions that make +(G) decay very
slowly, then ℓC will be very close to being linear.
Formally, and by elementary considerations, the theorem will follow if, for every
& : R→ R>0 with limG→∞&(G) = 0, we can findCDFs such that+(G) = −−(−G)
and lim infG→∞ +(G)/&(G) > 0.
Fix any & such that limG→∞&(G) = 0, but assume without loss of generality that
&(G) is monotone decreasing.1 Define a finite measure a on the integers by
a(=) = &(= − 1) −&(=)
e=
and
a(−=) = &(= − 1) −&(=)
1If & is not monotone decreasing then consider instead & ′(G) = supH≥G &(H).
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for all = ≥ 0. Note that a is indeed finite since
 :=
∞∑
==−∞
a(=) ≤ 2&(−1).
Note also that
∞∑
==−∞
a(=) · e=
is likewise equal to .
Let the private signal distributions be given by
P(BC = =|\ = +1) = −1a(=)e=
and
P(BC = =|\ = −1) = −1a(=).
Then
!C = log
P(BC |\ = +1)
P(BC |\ = −1)
= BC ,
the distribution of !C is identical to that of BC , and so + = + and − = −. By our
definition of −, we have that for G > 0
−(−G) = −1 · &(dGe − 1). (A.2)
Now, by Lemma 27, we know that
(1 − n) · −(−G) < +(G) < (1 + n) · −(−G),
for any n > 0 and all G large enough. It follows that
lim inf
G→∞
+(G)
&(G) = lim infG→∞
−(−G)
&(G) ,
which, by (A.2) equals
lim inf
G→∞
−1&(dGe − 1)
&(G) ≥ 
−1.
63
A.2 Long-term behavior of public belief
The primary goal of this section is to prove Theorem 3, which states that public
belief is asymptotically given by the solution to the differential equation (2.3). The
proof of this theorem uses two general lemmas regarding recurrence relations. We
state these lemmas now and prove them later. The first lemma states that two similar
recurrence relations yield similar solutions. The second shows that the solution to
a recurrence relation (of the type we are interested in) is well approximated by the
solution to the corresponding differential equation.
Lemma 28. Let ,  : R>0 → R>0 be continuous, eventually monotone decreasing,
and tending to zero.
Let (0C) and (1C) be sequences satisfying the recurrence relations
0C+1 = 0C + (0C)
1C+1 = 1C + (1C).
Suppose
lim
G→∞
(G)
(G) = 1.
Then
lim
C→∞
0C
1C
= 1.
Lemma 29. Assume that  : R>0 → R>0 is a continuous function with a convex
differentiable tail, and that (G) goes to 0 as G goes to∞. Let (0C) be any sequence
satisfying the recurrence equation 0C+1 = 0C + (0C), and suppose there is a function
5 : R>0 → R>0 with 5 ′(C) = ( 5 (C)) for all sufficiently large C. Then
lim
C→∞
5 (C)
0C
= 1.
Given these lemmas, we are ready to prove our theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let (0C) be any sequence in R>0 satisfying:
0C+1 = 0C + −(−0C).
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Then by Lemma 29, the sequence (0C) is well approximated by 5 (C), the solution to
the corresponding differential equation:
lim
C→∞
0C
5 (C) = 1.
Now, conditional on \ = +1, all agents take action +1 from some point on with
probability 1. Thus, with probability 1,
ℓC+1 = ℓC + +(ℓC)
for all sufficiently large C. Further, by Lemma 27,
lim
G→∞
+(G)
−(−G)
= 1.
So by Lemma 28,
lim
C→∞
ℓC
0C
= 1
with probability 1. Thus, we have
lim
C→∞
ℓC
5 (C) = limC→∞
ℓC
0C
· 0C
5 (C) = 1
with probability 1.
Proofs of Lemmas 28 and 29
Proof of Lemma 28. We prove the claim in two steps. First, we show that for every
Y > 0 there are infinitely many times C such that
(1 − Y)0C ≤ 1C ≤ (1 + Y)0C . (A.3)
Second, we show that if (A.3) holds for some C large enough, then it holds for all
C′ > C, proving the claim.
We start with step 1. Assume without loss of generality that 0C ≤ 1C for infinitely
many values of C. Fix Y > 0. To show that (1 − Y)0C ≤ 1C ≤ (1 + Y)0C holds for
infinitely many values of C, let G0 > 1 be such that for all G > G0 it holds that  and
 are monotone decreasing,
(G), (G) < Y < 1
and
(1 − Y/2)(G) < (G) < (1 + Y/2)(G). (A.4)
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Assume that 0C , 1C > G0; this will indeed be the case for C large enough, since  and
 are positive and continuous, and so both 0C and 1C are monotone increasing and
tend to infinity. So
(1C) < (1 + Y/2)(1C) ≤ (1 + Y/2)(0C),
where the first inequality follows from (A.4), and the second follows from the fact
that  is monotone decreasing and 0C < 1C . Since (1(C)) = 1C+1 − 1(C) and
(0C) = 0C+1 − 0(C) we have shown that
1C+1 − 1C < (1 + Y/2) (0C+1 − 0C),
and so eventually 1C ≤ (1 + Y)0C . Also, notice that the first time this obtains, we
also have that the left inequality in (A.3) holds at the same moment:
1C > 1C−1 > 0C−1 = 0C − (0C − 0C−1) > 0C − Y > 0C − Y0C = (1 − Y)0C .
This completes the first step. Now we go to step 2. Here we show that if (A.3) holds
for large enough C then it holds for all C′ > C.
Fix Y > 0, and let G0 be defined as above. Suppose that (1 − Y)0C < 1C < (1 + Y)0C ,
with 0C , 1C > G0. Assume without loss of generality that 1C ≥ 0C . Then our
assumptions and (A.4) imply
1C+1 = 1C + (1C)
< (1 + Y)0C + (1 + Y)(1C).
Because 0C ≤ 1C and  is decreasing we have
1C+1 < (1 + Y)0C + (1 + Y)(0C)
= (1 + Y)0C+1.
For the other direction, note first that
1C+1 > 1C ≥ 0C ,
by assumption. We can write 0C = (1 − Y)0C + Y0C , and since 0C > G0 > 1,
Y0C > (1 − Y)Y, and so
1C+1 > (1 − Y)0C + (1 − Y)Y.
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Now, Y > (0C) since 0C > G0, and so
1C+1 > (1 − Y)0C + (1 − Y)(0C)
= (1 − Y)0C+1.
Thus
(1 − Y)0C+1 < 1C+1 < (1 + Y)0C+1, (A.5)
as required.
Proof of Lemma 29. We restrict the domain of 5 to the interval (C0,∞) such that for
C > C0 it already holds that 5 ′(C) = ( 5 (C)). Since  is continuous, limC→∞ 5 (C) =
∞, and so we can also assume that in the interval ( 5 (C0),∞) it holds that  is convex
and differentiable.
Since 5 is strictly increasing in (C0,∞), it has an inverse 5 −1. For G large enough
define (G) = 5 ( 5 −1(G) + 1) − G.
Now, let (1C) be any sequence satisfying the recurrence relation
1C+1 = 1C + (1C).
In order to apply Lemma 28, we will first show that
lim
G→∞
(G)
(G) = 1.
Let C = 5 −1(G). Such a C exists and is unique for all sufficiently large G, because 5
is monotone. Notice that by the definitions of (G) and 5 ′(G)
(G) = 5 ( 5 −1(G) + 1) − G
= 5 ( 5 −1(G) + 1) − G − 5 ′( 5 −1(G)) + 5 ′( 5 −1(G))
= 5 (C + 1) − 5 (C) − 5 ′(C) + ( 5 (C)),
where in the last equality we substitute C = 5 −1(G). Because 5 ′ is positive and
decreasing ( 5 is concave) then 5 (C + 1) − 5 (C) ≥ 5 ′(C + 1), and so
(G) ≥ 5 ′(C + 1) − 5 ′(C) + ( 5 (C)).
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By the definition of 5 , 5 ′(C) = ( 5 (C)), and so
(G) ≥ ( 5 (C + 1)) − ( 5 (C)) + ( 5 (C)) = ( 5 (C + 1)).
Again, due to concavity of 5 we have 5 (C + 1) ≤ 5 (C) + 5 ′(C) and as  is decreasing
and convex we get
(G) ≥ ( 5 (C) + 5 ′(C))
≥ ′( 5 (C)) 5 ′(C) + ( 5 (C))
= ′( 5 (C))( 5 (C)) + ( 5 (C)).
We now substitute back G = 5 (C):
(G) ≥ ′(G)(G) + (G)
= (G) (′(G) + 1)
so in particular, since ′(G) → 0 as G →∞,
lim inf
G→∞
(G)
(G) ≥ 1.
Now we are going to show that lim supG→∞
(G)
(G) ≤ 1 which will conclude the proof.
By the definitions of 5 −1(G) and (G)
(G) = ( 5 (C)) = 5 (C + 1) − 5 (C) =
∫ C+1
C
5 ′(Z) dZ .
As 5 ′ is decreasing it follows that
(G) ≤
∫ C+1
C
5 ′(C) dZ = 5 ′(C) = ( 5 (C)) = (G).
Therefore,
lim sup
G→∞
(G)
(G) ≤ 1.
Hence, from these two inequalities we get that
lim
G→∞
(G)
(G) = 1.
Now notice that, by construction, 5 (C + 1) = 5 (C) + ( 5 (C)). Thus, by Lemma 28,
lim
=→∞
5 (C)
0C
= 1.
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Monotonicity of solutions to a differential equation
We now prove a general lemma regarding differential equations of the form 0′(C) =
(0(C)). It shows that the solutions to this equation are monotone in . This is
useful for calculating approximate analytic solutions whenever it is impossible to
find analytic exact solutions, as is the case of Gaussian signals, in which we use this
lemma.
Lemma 30. Let ,  : R>0 → R>0 be continuous, and let 0, 1 : R>0 → R>0 satisfy
0′(C) = (0(C)) and 1′(C) = (1(C)) for all sufficiently large C.
Suppose that
lim inf
G→∞
(G)
(G) > 1.
Then 0(C) > 1(C) for all sufficiently large C.
Proof. Notice that 0(C) and 1(C) are eventually monotone increasing and tend to
infinity as C tends to infinity. Thus for all G greater than some G0 > 0 large enough,
0 and 1 have inverses that satisfy the following differential equations:
d
dG
0−1(G) = 1
(G)
d
dG
1−1(G) = 1
(G) ·
Since lim infG (G)/(G) > 1, we can furthermore choose G0 so that for all G ≥ G0,
(G) > (1 + Y)(G) for some Y > 0. Thus, for G > G0
0−1(G) = 0−1(G0) +
∫ G
G0
1
(G) dG
1−1(G) = 1−1(G0) +
∫ G
G0
1
(G) dG
and so
0−1(G) < 0−1(G0) +
1
1 + Y
∫ G
G0
1
(G) dG
= 0−1(G0) +
1
1 + Y (1
−1(G) − 1−1(G0))
and thus
0−1(G) − 1−1(G) < − Y
1 + Y 1
−1(G) +
[
0−1(G0) −
1
1 + Y 1
−1(G0)
]
.
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Since 1−1(G) tends to infinity as G tends to infinity, it follows that for all sufficiently
large G, 0−1(G) < 1−1(G). Thus, for all sufficiently large C
C = 0−1(0(C)) < 1−1(0(C)),
and so, since 1(C) is monotone increasing,
1(C) < 0(C).
Eventual monotonicity of public belief update
We end this section with a lemma that shows that under some technical conditions
on the left tail of −, the function D+(G) = G + +(G) (i.e., the function that
determines how the public log-likelihood ratio is updated when the action +1 is
taken) is eventually monotone increasing.
Lemma 31. Suppose − has a convex and differentiable left tail. Then the map
D+(G) = G + +(G) is monotone increasing for all sufficiently large G.
Proof. Recall that
+(G) = log
1 − +(−G)
1 − −(−G)
·
Since − has a differentiable left tail, it has a derivative 6−(−G) for all G large
enough. It then follows from (A.1) that + also has a derivative in this domain, and
D′+(G) = 1 +
6+(−G)
1 − +(−G)
− 6−(−G)
1 − −(−G)
= 1 + e
−G6−(−G)
1 − +(−G)
− 6−(−G)
1 − −(−G)
·
Since 1 − −(−G) and 1 − +(−G) tend to 1 as G tends to infinity,
lim
G→∞
D′+(G) = lim
G→∞
1 + e−G6−(−G) − 6−(−G).
Since − is eventually convex, 6−(−G) tends to zero, and therefore
lim
G→∞
D′+(G) = 1.
In particular, D′+(G) is positive for G large enough, and hence D+(G) is eventually
monotone increasing.
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A.3 Gaussian private signals
Preliminaries
We say that private signals are Gaussian when − is the normal distribution with
mean −1 and variance f2, and + is the normal distribution with mean +1 and
variance f2. To calculate the evolution of ℓC , we need to calculate + and −, the
conditional distributions of the private log-likelihood ratio !C . Notice that in this
case
!C = log
e−(BC−1)2/2f2
e−(BC−(−1))2/2f2
= 2BC/f2,
so that !C is simply proportional to the signal BC . It follows that !C is also nor-
mally distributed, conditioned on the state \, and that + and − are cumulative
distribution functions of Gaussians, with variance 4/f2.
Notation
In this section and those that follow, we denote by ℓ∗C the public log-likelihood ratio
when all agents before agent C take the correct action. Formally,
ℓ∗C = log
P(\ = +1 | 01 = · · · = 0C−1 = +1)
P(\ = −1 | 01 = · · · = 0C−1 = +1)
·
For convenience, we will also use the notation P+(·) as shorthand for P(· | \ = +1).
The evolution of public belief
Proof of Theorem 4. Let 5 : R>0 → R>0 be any function such that 5 ′(C) = −(− 5 (C))
for all sufficiently large C. Then by Theorem 3,
lim
C→∞
ℓC
5 (C) = 1
with probability 1.
Recall from above that !C is distributed normally, and −(−G) is the CDF of a
normal distribution with variance g2 = 4/f2.
For 1 > [ ≥ 0, define
[ (G) =
e−
1−[
2g2
G2
G
5[ (C) =
√
2g√
1 − [
√
log(C) + log (1 − [)
2
2g2
·
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By a routine application of L’Hospital’s rule, 0 and [ are lower and upper bounds
for −, in the sense that
lim
G→∞
−(−G)
0(G)
= ∞
lim
G→∞
[ (G)
−(−G)
= ∞, [ > 0.
Since 5 ′[ (C) = [ ( 5[ (C)) for all sufficiently large C, we have by Lemma 30 that for
any [ > 0,
50(C) < 5 (C) < 5[ (C)
for all sufficiently large C. So
lim inf
C→∞
5 (C)
√
2g
√
log C
= lim inf
C→∞
5 (C)
50(C)
≥ 1
and for any [ > 0,
lim sup
C→∞
5 (C)
√
2g
√
log C
=
1√
1 − [
· lim sup
C→∞
5 (C)
5[ (C)
≤ 1√
1 − [
·
Thus,
lim
C→∞
5 (C)
√
2g
√
log C
= lim
C→∞
5 (C)
(2
√
2/f)
√
log C
= 1
so with probability 1,
lim
C→∞
ℓC
(2
√
2/f)
√
log C
= lim
C→∞
ℓC
5 (C) ·
5 (C)
(2
√
2/f)
√
log C
= 1.
To prove Theorem 5, we will need two lemmas. The first is general, and will be used
several times in the sequel, while the second deals exclusively with the Gaussian
case.
Denote by C the event that 0g = +1 for all g ≥ C; that is, that there are no more
mistakes after time C. The next lemma provides a uniform bound for the probability
of C , conditioned on the public belief. It implies, in particular, that the probability
of 1 is positive, which we will use in the proof of Theorem 5.
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Lemma 32. Suppose − and + are continuous, and − has a convex and differ-
entiable left tail. Then for every ! ∈ R, there is some <! > 0 such that for any C,
G ≥ ! implies P+(C | ℓC = G) ≥ <! .
Proof. Recall the definition of the public belief `C = P(\ = +1|01, . . . , 0C−1).
The process (`1, `2, . . .) is a bounded martingale, and therefore, by a standard
argument on bounded martingales, if we condition on `C = @, then the probability
that `g ≤ 1/2 for some g > C is at most 2(1 − @).2 This event is precisely the
complement of C , and therefore we have that P(C | `C = @) is at least 2@ − 1.
Hence, conditioning on \ = +1, we have that P+(C | `C = 1 − @) ≥ (2@ − 1)/@,
which is positive for all @ > 1/2.
Since `C = @ is equivalent to ℓC = log @/(1 − @), what we have shown implies that
there is an Y > 0 such that for all G ≥ 1 (here the choice of 1 is arbitrary and can be
replaced with any positive number)
P+(C | ℓC = G) > Y.
Now, for any ! < 1, the compactness of the interval [!, 1], together with the
continuity of− and+, implies that there is an =! such that if ℓC ≥ !, and if agents
C through C + =! − 1 take action +1, then ℓC+=! > 1. Further, since the probability of
agents C through C + =! − 1 all taking action +1 conditional on ℓC = G is continuous
in G, there is a ?! > 0 such that
P+(C | ℓC = G) ≥ ?! · Y
since with probability at least ?! there are no mistakes up to time C + =! , and thence
there are no mistakes with probability at least Y.
Lemma 33. Assume private signals are Gaussian. For every Y > 0 there exists
some : > 0 such that for all C,
P+(0C = −1 | 0g = +1 for all g < C) >
:
C1+Y
·
Proof. By the definitions of ℓ∗C and +,
P+(0C = −1 | 0g = +1 for all g < C) = P+(0C = −1 | ℓC = ℓ∗C )
= +(−ℓ∗C ).
2Intuitively, if I assign high belief now to the event \ = +1, then the probability that I assign this
event low belief in the future must be small.
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Now, by Theorem 4, for every V > 0, ℓ∗C < (1 + V) 2
√
2
f
√
log C for all sufficiently
large C. Further, it follows from a routine application of L’Hopital’s rule (or from
the standard asymptotic expansion for the CDF of a normal distribution) that for all
sufficiently large G,
+(−G) >
e−(f2/8)G2
G
·
Let Y > 0, and take V <
√
1 + Y − 1. Then by monotonicity of +(−G) and a
straightforward calculation,
+(−ℓ∗C ) > +(−(1 + V)
2
√
2
f
√
log C)
>
[
1
(1 + V) 2
√
2
f
]
· C
(1+Y)−(1+V)2√
log C
· 1
C1+Y
>
1
C1+Y
for all sufficiently large C. From this, the claim follows immediately.
Proof of Theorem 5. Denote by C be the event that 0g = +1 for all g < C, and note
that the event )1 = C is simply the intersection of C with the event that 0C = −1.
Let Y > 0. By Lemma 33 there is some :′ > 0 such that for all C,
P+(0C = −1 |C) >
:′
C1+Y
·
Now, put W = P+(0g = +1 for all g ≥ 1), the probability that all agents take the
correct action. By Lemma 32, W > 0, so this provides a lower bound on the
probability of the first C − 1 agents taking the correct action. Formally,
P+(C) ≥ P+(0g = +1 for all g ≥ 1) = W.
Thus,
P+()1 = C) = P+(0C = −1, C)
= P+(0C = −1 |C) · P+(C)
≥ W:
′
C1+Y
for all C.
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A.4 Upsets and runs
We recall a few definitions from Section 2.3. We say that there is an upset at time
C if 0C−1 ≠ 0C . We denote by Ξ the random variable which assigns to each outcome
the total number of upsets, and by ΞC the total number of upsets at times up to and
including C. We say that there is a run of length< from C if 0C = 0C+1 = · · · = 0C+<−1.
Note that this definition does not preclude a run from being part of a longer run; we
will refer to a run of finite length which is not strictly contained in any other run as
maximal. We say that a run from C is good if 0C = +1 and bad otherwise.
Notice that the number of maximal runs is exactly equal to the number of upsets.
We use this observation now to show that the probability of having many maximal
runs is very small, so that most of the probability is concentrated in the outcomes
with few maximal runs.
Proof of Proposition 7. Denote byΥ the random variable which assigns to each out-
come the number of finite maximal good runs it contains; note that with probability
1, Υ is finite.
By Lemma 32, there is a V > 0 such that for any G ≥ 0, if ℓC = G, then the probability
that all agents from C on take the correct action is at least V. Formally,3
P+(0g = +1 for all g ≥ C | ℓC = G) ≥ V.
Thus, whenever 0C−1 = −1 and 0C = +1 (or C = 1), the probability that there is
exactly one more maximal good run is at most 1 − V. It follows that for = ≥ 0,
P+(Υ = = + 1) ≤ (1 − V)P+(Υ = =)
and thus, for any = ≥ 0,
P+(Υ = =) ≤ (1 − V)=P+(Υ = 0)
and so
P+(Υ ≥ =) ≤
P+(Υ = 0)
V
· (1 − V)=.
Finally, since Υ = bΞ/2c, we have for any =:
P+(Ξ ≥ =) ≤ P+(Υ ≥ b=/2c) ≤ 2 · W=
where 2 = P+(Υ = 0)/V and W = (1 − V)
1
3 .
3We remind the reader that P+ (·) is shorthand for P(· | \ = +1).
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Whenever asymptotic learning occurs (that is, whenever the probability that all
agents take the correct action from some point on is equal to 1), the total number of
upsets is almost surely finite. In particular, the probability that ΞC is logarithmic in
C tends to zero as C tends to infinity. Using Proposition 7, we can show that in fact
this probability tends to 0 quickly:
Corollary 34. Let 2, W be as in Proposition 7. Then
P(ΞC ≥ −
2.1
log W
log C) ≤ 2 · 1
C2.1
·
Proof.
P(ΞC ≥ −
2.1
log W
log C) ≤ P(Ξ ≥ − 2.1
log W
log C)
≤ 2 · W−
2.1
log W log C
= 2 · 1
C2.1
·
In fact, it is equally easy to show the same statement for exponents larger than 2.1,
but this will suffice for our purposes.
One important consequence of Corollary 34 is that with high probability, there is at
least one maximal run before time C which is long relative to C. Thus, much of the
dynamics is controlled by what happens during long runs.
We previously analyzed only long runs that start at time 1, when the public log-
likelihood ratio is equal to 0. If a long run starts at some public belief ℓC ≠ 0 then
its evolution is different from the former case. However, if the run is long enough
then the analysis above can still be applied. The following lemma states that if a run
starts at some ℓC > 0 then we can bound the future public belief from below using
ℓ∗.
Lemma 35. Suppose that − has a convex and differentiable left tail. Then there
exists a I > 0 such that, if there is a good run of length B from C, then ℓC+B ≥ ℓ∗B−I.
Proof. Let D+(G) = G + +(G). Then by (2.1), whenever agent C takes action +1,
ℓC+1 = D+(ℓC).
Since − is eventually convex and differentiable, D+(G) is monotone increasing for
sufficiently large G, by Lemma 31. Take
I = min {C ∈ N : D+(G) is monotone on (ℓ∗C − 1,∞)}.
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Now, let ` = infG∈[0,ℓ∗I] +(G). By continuity of +(G) and compactness of [0, ℓ∗I ],
` > 0, since +(G) > 0 for all G. Put # = d
ℓ∗I
`
e. Then for all G ∈ [0, ℓ∗I ],
D#+ (G) ≥ ` · # ≥ ℓ∗I . Further, since D+(G) > G for all G, it follows that whenever
there is a run of length # from C, ℓC+# > ℓ∗I .
This implies that if there is a good run from C of length B ≥ # , then ℓC+B ≥ ℓ∗B−I.
A.5 Distributions with polynomial tails
In this appendix we prove Theorem 6, showing that for private log-likelihood dis-
tributions with polynomial tails, the expected time to learn is finite.
As in the setting of Theorem 6, assume that the conditional distributions of the
private log-likelihood ratio satisfy
+(G) = 1 −
2
G:
for all G > G0 (A.6)
−(G) =
2
(−G):
for all G < −G0 (A.7)
for some G0 > 0.
We remind the reader that we denote by ℓ∗C the log-likelihood ratio of the public belief
that results when the first C − 1 agents take action +1. It follows from Theorem 3
that in this setting, ℓ∗C behaves asymptotically as C1/(:+1) . Notice also that, by the
symmetry of the model, the log-likelihood ratio of the public belief that results when
the first C − 1 agents take action −1 is −ℓ∗C .
We begin with the simple observation that a strong enough bound on the probability
of mistake is sufficient to show that the expected time to learn is finite. Formally,
we have the following lemma. We remind the reader that P+(·) is shorthand for
P(· | \ = +1).
Lemma 36. Suppose there exist : , Y > 0 such that for all C ≥ 1, P+(0C = −1) <
: · 1
C2+Y
. Then E+()!) is finite.
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Proof. Since )! = C only if 0C−1 = −1, P+()! = C) ≤ P+(0C−1 = −1). Thus
E+()!) =
∞∑
C=1
C · P+()! = C)
≤ P+()! = 1) +
∞∑
C=2
C · P+(0C−1 = −1)
≤ 1 + :
∞∑
8=2
C
(C − 1)2+Y
< ∞.
Accordingly, this section will be primarily devoted to studying the rate of decay of
the probability of mistake, P+(0C = −1). In order to bound this probability, we will
need to make use of the following lemmas, which give some control over how the
public belief is updated following an upset.
Lemma 37. For + and − as in (A.6) and (A.7), |ℓC+1 | ≤ |ℓC | whenever |ℓC | is
sufficiently large and 0C ≠ 0C+1.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that 0C = +1 and 0C+1 = −1, so that
ℓC+1 = ℓC + −(ℓC).
Thus, to prove the claim we compute a bound for −. To do so we first obtain a
bound for the left tail of +. By assumption, for G > G0 (with G0 as in (A.6) and
(A.7)),
6−(−G) = ′−(−G) =
2:
G:+1
and so by (A.1),
6+(−G) = e−G6−(−G) = 2:
e−G
G:+1
.
Hence,
+(−G) =
∫ −G
−∞
6+(Z) dZ =
∫ −G
−∞
2:
eZ
(−Z):+1
dZ = 2:
∫ ∞
G
Z−:−1e−Z dZ .
For Z sufficiently large, Z−:−1 is at least, say, e−.1Z . Thus, for G sufficiently large,
+(−G) ≥ 2:
∫ ∞
G
e−1.1Z dZ =
2:
1.1
e−1.1G .
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It follows that for G sufficiently large,
−(G) = log
+(−G)
−(−G)
≥ log 2:
1.1
− 1.1G + : log G ≥ −1.2G.
Thus, for ℓC sufficiently large,
ℓC+1 = ℓC + −(ℓC) = ℓC + log
+(−ℓC)
−(−ℓC)
≥ ℓC + 1.2(−ℓC) = −.2ℓC
so in particular, |ℓC+1 | < |ℓC |.
Wewill make use of the following lemma, which bounds the range of possible values
that ℓC can take.
Lemma 38. For + and − as in (A.6) and (A.7), there exists an " > 0 such that
for all C ≥ 0, |ℓB | ≤ " · ℓ∗C for all B ≤ C.
Proof. For each g ≥ 0, define
"g = max
|ℓg |
ℓ∗g
where the maximum is taken over all outcomes. Note that there are at most 2g
possible values for this expression, so "g is well-defined and finite. Put
" = sup
g≥0
"g .
To establish the claim, we must show that " is finite. To do this, it suffices to show
that for g sufficiently large, "g+1 ≤ "g.
Now, let D+(G) = G + +(G) and D−(G) = G + −(G). Then as shown in the section
about the model, whenever agent g takes action +1, ℓg+1 = D+(ℓg), and whenever
agent g takes action −1, ℓg+1 = D−(ℓg).
By Lemma 31, D+ and D− are eventually monotonic. Thus, there exists G0 > 0
such that D+ is monotone increasing on (G0,∞) and D− is monotone decreasing on
(−∞,−G0).
For g sufficiently large, ℓ∗g > G0. Further, it follows from Lemma 37 that for g
sufficiently large, |ℓg+1 | < |ℓg | whenever 0g ≠ 0g+1 and |ℓg | > |ℓ∗g |. Let (0g) be any
sequence of actions with |ℓg+1 |
ℓ∗
g+1
= "g+1. If 0g ≠ 0g+1
"g+1 =
|ℓg+1 |
ℓ∗
g+1
≤ |ℓg |
ℓ∗g
≤ "g .
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If 0g = 0g+1, then either "g+1 = 1, in which case "g+1 ≤ "g, or "g+1 > 1.
If "g+1 > 1, then since |+ | and |− | are decreasing on (G0,∞) and (−∞,−G0)
respectively, |ℓg+1 − ℓg |/|ℓg | ≤ |ℓ∗g+1 − ℓ
∗
g |/|ℓ∗g |. So
"g+1 =
|ℓg+1 |
ℓ∗
g+1
=
|ℓg | + |ℓg+1 − ℓg |
ℓ∗g + |ℓ∗g+1 − ℓ
∗
g |
where the second equality follows from the fact that ℓg and ℓg+1 have the same sign.
Finally,
"g+1 =
|ℓg |
ℓ∗g
· 1 + |ℓg+1 − ℓg |/|ℓg |
1 + |ℓ∗
g+1 − ℓ
∗
g |/ℓ∗g
≤ |ℓg |
ℓ∗g
≤ "g .
Thus, for all sufficiently large g, "g+1 ≤ "g.
Proposition 39. There exists ^ > 0 such that P+(0C = −1) < ^C−2.1 for all C > 0.
Proof. Let V = −2.1/log W, where W is as in Proposition 7. To carry out our analysis,
we will divide the event that 0C = −1 into three disjoint events and bound each of
them separately:
 = (0C = −1) and (ΞC > V log C)
1 = (0C = −1) and (ΞC ≤ V log C) and ( |{B : B < C, 0B = +1}| ≥
1
2
C)
2 = (0C = −1) and (ΞC ≤ V log C) and ( |{B : B < C, 0B = +1}| <
1
2
C).
First, by Corollary 34 we have a bound for P+()
P+() ≤ 2 ·
1
C2.1
.
Next, we bound P+(1). This is the event that the number of upsets so far is small
and the majority of agents so far have taken the correct action.
Since there are at most V log C upsets, there are at most 12 V log C maximal good runs.
Since, furthermore, there are at least 12 C agents who take action +1, there is at least
one maximal good run of length at least C/(V log C).
Thus, P+(1) is bounded from above by the probability that there are some B1 <
B2 < C such that there is a good run of length B2 − B1 ≥ C/(V log C) from B1 and
0B2 = −1.
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For fixed B1, B2, denote by B1,B2 the event that there is a good run of length B2 − B1
from B1. Denote by ΓB1,B2 the event (B1,B2 , 0B2 = −1). Then
P+(ΓB1,B2) = P+(0B2 = −1|B1,B2) · P+(B1,B2)
≤ P+(0B2 = −1|B1,B2).
By Lemma 35, there exists a I > 0 such that B1,B2 implies that ℓB2 ≥ ℓ∗B2−B1−I.
Therefore,
P+(ΓB1,B2) ≤ +(−ℓ∗B2−B1−I).
Since for C sufficiently large ℓ∗C > C
1
:+2 and since +(−G) ≤ e−G by (A.1),
P+(ΓB1,B2) ≤ e−U(B2−B1−I)
1
:+2 ≤ e−U(C/(V log C)−I)
1
:+2
.
To simplify, we further bound this last expression to arrive at, for some 2 > 0,
P+(ΓB1,B2) ≤ 2e−C
1
:+3
for all C. Since 1 is covered by fewer than C2 events of the form ΓB1,B2 (as B1 and B2
are less than C), it follows that
P+(1) < 2C2e−C
1
:+3
<
1
C2.1
for all C large enough.
Finally we bound P+(2). This is the event that the number of upsets so far is small
and the majority of agents so far have taken the wrong action. As in 1, there is a
maximal bad run of length at least C/(V log(C)).
Denote by ' the event that there is at least one bad run of length C/(V log(C)) before
time C and by 'B the event that agents B through B + C/(V log C) − 1 take action −1.
Since 2 is contained in ', and since ' is contained in the union ∪CB=1'B, we have
that
P+(2) ≤ P+(') ≤
C∑
B=1
P+('B).
Taking the maximum of all the addends in the right hand side, we can further bound
the probability of 2:
P+(2) ≤ C · max
1≤B≤C
P+('B).
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Conditioned on ℓB, the probability of 'B is
P+('B | ℓB) =
B+C/(V log C)−1∏
A=B
+(−ℓA).
By Lemma 38, there exists " > 0 such that |ℓA | ≤ "ℓ∗C , for all A ≤ C. Therefore,
since + is monotone,
P+('B) ≤ +("ℓ∗C )C/(V log C) .
It follows that
P+(2) ≤ C · +("ℓ∗C )C/(V log C) .
Since +(G) = 1 − 2 · G−: for G large enough, and since ℓ∗C is asymptotically at most
C1/(:+0.5) , we have that
log+("ℓ∗C ) ≤ −2"−: · C−:/(:+0.5) .
Thus
P+(2) ≤ C · exp
(
−2"−: · C1/(2:+1)/(V log C)
)
≤ C−2.1,
for all C large enough. This concludes the proof, because P+(0C = −1) = P+() +
P+(1) + P+(2) ≤ ^ 1C2.1 for some constant ^.
Given this bound on the probability of mistakes, the proof of the main theorem of
this section follows easily from Lemma 36.
Proof of Theorem 6. By Proposition 39, there exists ^ > 0 such that P(0C = −1 | \ =
+1) < ^ 1
C2.1
for all C ≥ 1. Hence, by Lemma 36 E()! | \ = +1) < ∞. By a symmetric
argument the same holds conditioned on \ = −1. Thus, the expected time to learn
is finite.
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A p p e n d i x B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
B.1 Binary distributions
The primary goal of this chapter is to prove Theorem 13, which gives the expected
utility when the initial public belief equal to 1/2 and the social planner chooses
to stop learning upon arrival at levels # or −# . The proof uses some properties
of the public belief, when signals are binary. For example, we show that it is a
random walk in Lemma 10 and that the utility in the current period, that is in LP, is
constant and equals to signal’s precision, @. The latter one is showed in Lemma 12.
Furthermore, we prove some general facts about the expected utility function and
how it changes for different beliefs by varying stopping # .
Proof of Proposition 8. This is a standard fact as each strategy {:C}∞C=1 gives a linear
function in belief ? and maximum of convex functions is convex.
Moreover, if ? ∈ {0, 1} then if we just go with our belief, always choose 1 when
? = 1 and always choose 0 otherwise, then our discounted utility is already going
to be 1 which is the maximal possible utility we can get.
Also, the game is completely symmetric around 1/2 and so our utility function D(?)
is also symmetric around 1/2.
Proof of Lemma 9. If C is in the learning period then player C has to act according
to her private signal: if BC = 86ℎ choose 1, if BC = !>F choose 0. Otherwise, she
either goes against her signal and chooses a non optimal action or chooses the same
action regardless of the BC . Both situations are not allowed either by the statement of
the lemma or by the assumption that agents are the expected utility maximizers.
Proof of Lemma 10. Suppose there were = actions 1 and : actions 0 between times
C0 and C=+: . Moreover, ∀C′ ∈ {0, . . . = + :} C′ ∈ !%, i.e. players’ actions non trivially
depended on their private signals. By lemma 9 we know that there were = 86ℎ
signals and : !>F ones.
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Let us think in terms of the likelihood ratio. As we said before, ;C is going to be
multiplied by @/(1− @) = times and (1− @)/@ : times. These factors do not depend
on ;C , therefore it also does not matter in which order we observe these actions, the
final likelihood is going to be equal to
;C ·
(
@
1 − @
)= (1 − @
@
) :
= ;C ·
(
@
1 − @
)=−:
.
Therefore, the public belief is a random walk on a fixed lattice and its position is
defined by the difference in the number of times we observed signals 86ℎ and !>F
and ;0 = 1.
Proof of Lemma 11. First we show that once a we stop learning (no prices, :C = 1)
there is no reason to reenact !% latter. Notice that from the social planner’s
perspective this game is stationary. Therefore, if it is optimal to stop at time C0 at
levels # and −# then at any time C′ > C0 there is no incentives to choose :C different
from 1 as we face the same problem as at time C0 when it is optimal to stop.
Second, suppose we choose to stop upon arrival at either level ℎ > 0 or ; < 0. Then
the expected utility at 1/2 satisfies the following relation
D(0.5) = 0; + E(XC)D(;) + 0ℎ + E(XC)D(ℎ),
where 0ℎ and 0; correspond to the utility that we get on the way to the corresponding
boundary and does not depend on D. Let us sum up the first two terms and the last
two and choose the biggest one. If they are equal - pick one. Let us say it is
the second one, that corresponds to level ℎ. Then due to the symmetry of D it is
profitable for the social planner to choose the lower level to be −ℎ instead of ;. This
concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 12. Suppose at time C the public belief ?C > @ and we are still
acquiring information/in the learning period. Depending on the private signal we
get, our posterior will be equal to
`C =

?C@
?C@ + (1 − @) (1 − ?C)
if we get the 86ℎ signal
?C (1 − @)
?C (1 − @) + @(1 − ?C)
if we get the !>F signal.
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Moreover, the former signal happens with probability (?C@ + (1 − ?C) (1 − @))
as with probability ?C we are in the 86ℎ state and with (1 − ?C) - in the !>F
state. The analogous calculation gives that the latter signal occurs with probability
?C (1− @) + @(1− ?C). Also, remember when we get the !>F private signal we take
action 0, so our expected utility is 1 − `C . Therefore, the expected utility today is
equal to
?C@
(?C@ + (1 − @) (1 − ?C))
(?C@ + (1 − @) (1 − ?C))+
+
(
1 − ?C (1 − @)(?C (1 − @) + @(1 − ?C))
)
(?C (1 − @) + @(1 − ?C)) = @.
And similarly we get the same expected utility if ?C < 1 − @.
Now we are ready to prove the main result.
Proof of Theorem 13. For notation convenience we write D= instead of D (?(=)).
We are going to start with solving (3.6) and then explain why D! (0.5) from (3.7) is
the same. We know that the solution for the recurrence equation
D= = (1 − X)@ + X(@D=+1 + (1 − @)D=−1)
is
D= = 21
(
1
2
(
1
X@
−
√
1 − 4@X2 + 4@2X2
X@
))=
+ 22
(
1
2
(
1
X@
+
√
1 − 4@X2 + 4@2X2
X@
))=
+ @,
for some constants 21 and 22. It is also straightforward to verify that these D=’s
indeed satisfy our recurrence equation. Now we need to solve for 21 and 22 using
boundary conditions D−# = (1−@)#/((1−@)# +@# ) and D# = @#/((1−@)# +@# ).
This results in two equations

(1 − @)#
@# + (1 − @)#
= 210
−#
1 + 220
−#
2 + @
@#
@# + (1 − @)#
= 210
#
1 + 220
#
2 + @
where
08 =
(
1
2
(
1
X@
±
√
1 − 4@X2 + 4@2X2
X@
))
.
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Thus, 
21 =
(
(1 − @)#
@# + (1 − @)#
− @
)
0#1 − 220
−#
2 0
#
1
22
(
0#2 − 0
2#
1 0
−#
2
)
=
@#
@# + (1 − @)#
− @ +
(
@ − (1 − @)
#
@# + (1 − @)#
)
02#1 .
It follows that
22 =
(
@#
@# +(1−@)# − @
)
+
(
@ − (1−@)
#
@# +(1−@)#
)
02#1
0#2 − 0
2#
1 0
−#
2
21 =
−
(
@#
@# +(1−@)# − @
)
0#1 0
#
2 −
(
@ − (1−@)
#
@# +(1−@)#
)
0−#2 0
#
1
0#2 − 0
2#
1 0
−#
2
Now we can plug this into our solution
D0 = 210
0
1 + 220
0
2 + @
=
−
(
@#
@# +(1−@)# − @
)
0#1 0
#
2 −
(
@ − (1−@)
#
@# +(1−@)#
)
0#2 0
#
1
0#2 − 0
2#
1 0
−#
2
+
+
(
@#
@# +(1−@)# − @
)
+
(
@ − (1−@)
#
@# +(1−@)#
)
02#1
0#2 − 0
2#
1 0
−#
2
=
(0#2 − 0
#
1 )
((
@#
@# +(1−@)# − @
)
−
(
@ − (1−@)
#
@# +(1−@)#
)
0#1 0
#
2
)
02#2 − 0
2#
1
=
(
@#
@# +(1−@)# − @
)
−
(
@ − (1−@)
#
@# +(1−@)#
) (
1−@
@
)#
0#2 + 0
#
1
,
where in the third equation we multiplied everything by 02 ≠ 0 and in the last one
we used the fact that
0102 =
1
4
(
1
X2@2
− 1 − 4@X
2 + 4@2X2
@2X2
)
=
1 − @
@
·
What is left to explain is why D! (0.5) would be the same as D (0.5) which would
save us time solving the second analogous system. Before, in state 86ℎ, we had
a random walk with a drift @ towards the boundary with higher utility, level # .
When we condition on state being !>F we have the same drift but in the opposite
direction, towards level −# . But notice that utilities of level −# in state !>F and
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level # in state 86ℎ are equal to each other. The same is true for the other two
boundary utilities. Moreover, in both states we have the same underlying lattice
for the random walk. Therefore, problem (3.7) is the same problem as (3.6) up to
renaming levels. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 14. This is a classic Gambler’s ruin problem (Feller, 1968)
Proof of Proposition 15 . For notation simplicity we will write D(=) instead of
D(?(=)).
We know, that the social planner adopts a symmetric strategy of stopping at levels
# or −# . Suppose that if we increase the stopping boundaries from # to # + 1 and
from −# to −# −1 correspondingly such that the utility at level # , D(#), increases.
Notice that the utility at level 0, given this strategy, is equal to the utility at the
boundary levels multiplied by the expected discount factor plus some utility that we
collect on the way to it. The randomness comes from the hitting the boundary levels
time. We divide this expression in two parts: for the level # and −# .
D(0.5) = 0−# + D(−#) E−# (XC) + 0# + D(#) E# (XC),
where 0−# , 0# are constants E±# (XC) is the expected discounted factor until we hit
the corresponding boundary.
Recall that D is symmetric and so D(−#) = D(#), therefore if we increase D(#)
then we increase D(0.5) also and vice versa. This concludes the proof.
Patient planner
Now we would like to see what happens to the optimal #∗ and the expected utility,
when the social planner becomesmore patient. In other words, how does the optimal
#∗ and D(0.5) behave, when X → 1. We first establish a condition for when #∗
does not go to ∞ when X → 1 in Proposition 16: precision also has to go to 1 at a
certain speed in this case. Secondly, we look at our expected utility as X increases,
but @ stays fixed in Proposition 17. There, we stumble upon (1− @)/@ factor for the
third time.
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Proof of Proposition 16. Recall that the expected utility when we start with prior
1/2 (at level #) and stop the random walk upon arrival at levels 2# or 0 is
D(#) =
−
(
− (1−@)
#
(1−@)# +@# + @
) (
1−@
@
)#
+
(
@#
@# +(1−@)# − @
)
0#1 + 0
#
2
+ @,
where 01 < 02 and
08 =
1
2
(
1
X@
±
√
1
(X@)2
− 4
@
+ 4
)
.
In order to find bounds on optimal # ∈ R we are going to focus on the first term
of D(#) as the second one is just a constant that does not affect optimal # , and let
@ = 1 − Y, X = 1 − W where Y, W → 0.
Notice, that D(#) is single-peaked in # , therefore, if # maximizes it over R and #∗
maximizes over N then #∗ is either d#e or b#c. Thus, bounds on # are going to
give very tight bounds on #∗. First, consider 08:
08 =
1
2
1 ±
√
1 − 4X2@ + 4@2X2 − 4@X + 4@X
X@
=
1
2
1 ±
√
(2@X − 1)2 + 4@X(1 − X)
X@
=
1
2
1 ± (2@X − 1 + 2@XW21) + >(W)
X@
,
where the thirds equality comes from Taylor series expansion of
√
02 + G around 0.
Therefore,
01 =
1
X@
− 1 −$ (W)
02 = 1 +$ (W)
Now we can take derivative of 6.
6′(#) =
((
(1−@)# ln(1−@) ((1−@)# +@# )−(1−@)# ((1−@)# ln(1−@)+@# ln @)
((1−@)# +@# )2
(1−@)#
@#
+ <1
(
1−@
@
)#
ln @1−@
)
(0#1 + 0
#
2 )2
+
+
(
@# ln @((1−@)# +@# )−@# ((1−@)# ln(1−@)+@# ln @)
((1−@)# +@# )2
) )
(0#1 + 0
#
2 ) − (0
#
1 ln 01 + 0
#
2 ln 02)<2
(0#1 + 0
#
2 )2
,
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where
@ ≥ <1 =
(
− (1 − @)
#
(1 − @)# + @#
+ @
)
≥ 2@ − 1
1 − @ ≥ <2 = −
(
− (1 − @)
#
(1 − @)# + @#
+ @
) (
1 − @
@
)#
+
(
@#
@# + (1 − @)#
− @
)
≥ 01
In order to satisfy F.O.C. nominator should be equal to 0(
−
(1 − @)#@# ln @1−@
((1 − @)# + @# )2
(1 − @)#
@#
+ <1
(
1 − @
@
)#
ln
@
1 − @ +
@# (1 − @)# ln @1−@
((1 − @)# + @# )2
)
(0#1 + 0
#
2 )−
− (0#1 ln 01 + 0
#
2 ln 02)<2 = 0
Notice that the left-hand side is smaller than
≤
(
<1
(
1 − @
@
)#
ln
@
1 − @
)
(210#2 ) − (0
#
2 ln(1 +$ (W)))<2
≤
(
<121
(
1 − @
@
)#
ln
@
1 − @
)
0#2 − 0
#
2 W<2,
where 28 > 1.
In order for this to be non negative we need # to satisfy the following constraint
# ≥
ln
<2W
21<1 ln(@/(1 − @))
ln
1 − @
@
≥ A2 ln W
ln Y
,
where A2 goes to 1 as W and X go to 0. At the same time, notice that LHS is bigger
than
≥ <1
(
1 − @
@
)#
ln
(
@
1 − @
)
0#2 − 0
#
2 W23<2,
where 23 > 1. In order for this to be non positive # should satisfy the following
constraint
# ≤
ln
W23<2
<1 ln(@/(1 − @))
ln
1 − @
@
·
1As # increases <1 gets very close to @ and <2 to 1 − @.
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Notice, that if (ln 23W) is smaller or proportional to ln (− ln ((1 − @)/@)) then # is
always finite and the lower bound is satisfied when @, X→ 1, as
ln
(
− ln 1−@
@
)
ln 1−@
@
→ 0
Otherwise, we get that
# ≤ ln W
A1 ln Y
,
for some constant A1. Moreover, if # satisfies these constraints then #∗ satisfies⌊
ln W
A1 ln Y
A
⌋
≥ #∗ ≥
⌈
A2 ln W
ln Y
⌉
.
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 17. Recall that
D(#) =
−
(
− (1−@)
#
(1−@)# +@# + @
) (
1−@
@
)#
+
(
@#
@# +(1−@)# − @
)
0#1 + 0
#
2
+ @.
01 =
1
(1 − W)@ − 1 −$ (W)
02 = 1 +$ (W)
After plugging expressions for 01 and 02 in D(#) we get
D(#) − @ =
−
(
− (1−@)
#
(1−@)# +@# + @
) (
1−@
@
)#
+
(
@#
@# +(1−@)# − @
)
(
1−@
@
−$ (W)
)#
+ (1 +$ (W))#
=
−
(
− (1−@)
#
(1−@)# +@# + @
) (
1−@
@
)#
+
(
@#
@# +(1−@)# − @
)
(
1−@
@
)#
− >(W) + 1 +$ (W#)
=
−
(
− (1−@)
#
(1−@)# +@# + @
) (
1−@
@
)#
+
(
@#
@# +(1−@)# − @
)
(
1−@
@
)#
+ 1
−$ (W#).
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From the proof of Proposition 16we know that when @ is fixed # behaves as$ (ln W).
Now, let us transform the first term into a more clear form
D(#) − @ =
(
@#
@# + (1 − @)#
− @
)
−
(
@#−(1−@)#
@# +(1−@)#
) (
1−@
@
)#(
1−@
@
)#
+ 1
−$ (W#)
As # →∞ and @ > 12 , ((1 − @)/@)
# → 0. Suppose ((1 − @)/@)# = a then
@#
@# + (1 − @)#
≥ 1 − a
and (
@#−(1−@)#
@# +(1−@)#
) (
1−@
@
)#(
1−@
@
)#
+ 1
≤ a
a + 1
≤ a.
From the proof of Theorem 16 a = $ (W). Hence,
D(#) − @ ≥ 1 − @ − 2a −$ (W#) = 1 − @ −$ (W ln W).
It means that as # →∞, D(#) goes to its maximal value as ((1−@)/@)# ·# → 0,
which is quicker than ((1 − @)/@)#: , for any : < 1. Also, as optimal #∗ increases
then absorbing beliefs are further away from 1/2.
B.2 Continuous distributions
In this section we study continuous distributions. For our purposes they differ in
a few aspects from the binary case. First of all, now we have to deal with more
complicated expressions for expected loss and gain. Second of all, the set of prices
that we can choose and that result in different outcomes is now continuous rather than
binary. This also complicates the analysis, especially if we do not have an explicit
expression for the expected utility. And the last, and probably the main difference,
is that the public belief is not a random walk anymore, but has an intricate behavior.
We start with bounded signals and establish an analogous result, to the one in the
classical sequential model (L. Smith and Sørensen, 2000): the underlying state of
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the world is never fully revealed if signals have bounded strength. To prove this, we
look at what are the expected loss and gain, when the social planner chooses a price
:C ≠ 1. As we do not know the exact formula for the expected utility function, we
first bound the expected gain in the public belief and then translate it to the expected
utility gain. The latter one uses the fact that D(?) is convex and the absolute value
of its derivative is less than 1.
Bounded private signals
Suppose without loss of generality that the modified LR satisfies @/(1 − @) ≥
?C
(1−?C ):C ≥ 1/2, so the 86ℎ state is more likely and we are still in the learning
period (less than @/(1 − @)). Given this, the total modified belief of agent C will be
in the interval [
?C
(1 − ?C):C
· 1 − @
@
;
?C
(1 − ?C):C
· @
1 − @
]
.
In order to get the final modified likelihood-ratio equal to H in the interval above we
need
6 (G)
6! (G)
= H · (1 − ?C):C
?C
·
Before we calculate the expected loss and the expected gain from the price :C we
need a few more facts.
Note 40. The public belief and the corresponding likelihood ratio satisfy the follow-
ing relation
?C =
;C
1 + ;C
·
Furthermore, if the total belief `C > 1/2 and agent C takes the action 0, then the
expected loss is `C − (1 − `C) = 2`C − 1.
The following lemma helps us understand how the change in the LR translates to
the change in the public belief.
Lemma 41. If ;C+1 = ;C (1 + X) then
?C+1 − ?C = X?C (1 − ?C) + >(X(1 − ?C)).
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Proof of Lemma 41. By the definition of the likelihood ratio
?C
1 − ?C
= G
?C+1
1 − ?C+1
= G(1 + X),
then
?C+1 − ?C =
G + GX
1 + G + GX −
G
1 + G
=
GX
(1 + G) (1 + G + GX)
=
X?C (1 − ?C)
(1 − ?C + ?C) (1 − ?C + ?C (1 + X))
= X?C (1 − ?C) + >(X(1 − ?C)).
Furthermore, the following relation is satisfied between the PDFs of the likelihood
ratio (L. Smith and Sørensen, 2000)
5 (G) = G 5! (G).
Therefore,
 (G) =
∫ G
1−@
@
5 (H)3H
=
∫ G
1−@
@
H 5! (H)3H
≤ G! (G)
(B.1)
These facts help us prove one of the main results, that if private signals are bounded
then the full revelation of the underlying state is not possible, unless X = 1.
Proof of Theorem 18. Let us start with the expected loss which is equal to∫ 1
0
(
2
G
?C
1−?C
1 + G ?C1−?C
− 1
)
(?C 5 (G) + (1 − ?C) 5! (G))3G
≥ 21?C
(

(
1 − ?C
?C
:C
)
− 
(
1 − @
@
))
+ (1 − ?C)
(
!
(
1 − ?C
?C
:C
)
− !
(
1 − @
@
))
= 21
(
?C
(
1 − ?C
?C
:C
)
+ (1 − ?C)!
(
1 − ?C
?C
:C
))
,
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where 0 = (1 − @)/@, 1 = (1 − ?C):C/?C and 21 gets arbitrary close to 1 as ?C goes
to 1. Notice that we can make (1− ?C):C/?C as close to (1− @)/@ as we want, which
is the lowest value for the likelihood ratio.
Now let us find the expected gain. Remember that the modified public belief is
?C/((1 − ?C):C). Hence we get the following expressions for ?C+1/(1 − ?C+1)
(
?C+1
1 − ?C+1
)
=
?C
1 − ?C
·
1 − 
(
(1−?C ):C
?C
)
1 − !
(
(1−?C ):C
?C
)
if player C buys the new product (random walk goes up) and(
?C+1
1 − ?C+1
)
=
?C
1 − ?C
·

(
(1−?C ):C
?C
)
!
(
(1−?C ):C
?C
)
if she does not (random walk goes down). Here, underline and overline represent
possible LRs that can result from the current public belief ?C and price :C depending
on the action of player C.
As utility function on [0.5, 1] is convex and symmetric around 0.5 we know that
expected gain is less than D(?C+1) −D(?C) (as if we go up with probability 1). Which
in its turn is less than ?C+1 − ?C as D is also above 45 degree line and at 1 is equal to
1. In order to calculate the latter we should find (?C+1/(1 − ?C+1)). We are thinking
about (1 − ?C):C/?C as a point close to the left end of the domain of  and ! , so
in the following calculation we are using notation Y = (1 − ?C):C/?C .
(
?C+1
1 − ?C+1
)
=
?C
1 − ?C
©­­«
1 − 
(
(1−?C ):C
?C
)
1 − !
(
(1−?C ):C
?C
) ª®®¬
≤ ?C
1 − ?C
(
1 − 22! (Y)) (1 + ! (Y) +$ (2− (Y))
)
=
?C
1 − ?C
(1 + ! (Y) (1 − 22) +$ (2! (Y)))
where 22 > 0 is a constant comes from (B.1). And hence,
X(?C+1 − ?C) ≤ X
! (Y) (1 − 22) (1 − ?C)
?C
+$ (2! (Y))
=
! (Y) (X(1 − ?C + ?C22 − 22))
?C
+$ (2! (Y)).
Comparing it to ! (Y) ((1− X) (1− ?C + ?C22))21 tells us that for ?C → 1 coefficient
X(1 − ?C + ?C22 − 22)/(?C) goes to 0whereas the other one goes to (1−X)22 > 0.
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Unbounded private signals
Now we are going to consider an example of unbounded private signals. This is the
only situation, when it is appropriate to talk about the asymptotic speed of learning,
as in other cases the public belief does not converge to 0 or 1. The secondmain result
is Theorem 19, which says that the optimal prices, :C , are bounded away from 0 and
∞ and that it is optimal to choose a positive price, :C > 1, when the public belief
is high enough. We need to assume that ?C is high due to the lack of information
about D and its derivative. As we mentioned above, if we use the results from the
numerical calculation, it can be generalized for ?C ≥ 1/2.
One of the corollaries is that we indeed have the asymptotic learning and the
asymptotic speed of learning is also significantly increased, due to taxation of the
good that is more likely to be better. The situation when ?C < 1/2 is symmetric.
Recall that the CDFs of the likelihood ratios are
 (H) = P
(
6 (B)
6! (B)
≤ H
\ = 86ℎ) = H2(1 + H)2
! (H) = P
(
6 (B)
6! (B)
≤ H
\ = !>F) = H2 + 2H(1 + H)2 ,
for H ∈ [0,∞].
Proof of Theorem 19. Recall that if we apply non zero price :C then we have the
expected loss due to non optimal actions and the expected gain from bigger expected
increase in public belief ?C+1. We start with the former one.
Suppose we have a public belief ?C and a price at this period is :C . As was stated in
the Section 3.1, agent C is going to buy the new product iff
?C
(1 − ?C):C
· 6 (G)
6! (G)
≥ 1.
Notice, that a player C will take a non optimal action only if her likelihood belief
with price :C is less than 1 and her likelihood belief without the price is above 1.
More formally private likelihood ratio can take the following values
(1 − ?C):C
?C
≥ 6 (G)
6! (G)
≥ 1 − ?C
?C
If a person C gets a private likelihood belief in this interval and her total likelihood
(without accounting for the price) is equal to H then the loss, due to taking a non
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optimal action, is equal to
2H
1 + H − 1.
Therefore, expected loss ; (?C , :C) has the following form
; (?C , :C) =
∫ 1
0
©­«
2G (1−?C )
?C
G
(1−?C )
?C
+ 1
− 1ª®¬ (?C 5 (G) + (1 − ?C) 5! (G)) 3G
≤
(
2:C
:C + 1
− 1
) ∫ 1
0
(?C 5 (G) + (1 − ?C) 5! (G)) 3G
=
(
:C − 1
:C + 1
) (
?C
(

(
(1 − ?C):C
?C
)
− 
(
1 − ?C
?C
))
+
+ (1 − ?C)
(
!
(
(1 − ?C):C
?C
)
− !
(
1 − ?C
?C
)) )
,
where 0 = (1−?C )
?C
and 1 = (1−?C ):C
?C
. After pluging in the expressions for 8 we get
; (?C , :C) =
((−1 + :C)2?2C (1 − ?C)2)
(:C + ?C − :C ?C)2
·
Now let us go to the expected gain term. Suppose that in period C the public belief
?C > 1/2 is high enough. If there is no price, :C = 1, then the public belief in the
next period goes to either 0 or 1 depending on the action of player C (buying the new
and the old products correspondingly). And if we apply a price :C then the public
belief in the next period goes to 0′ and 1′ correspondingly
0 =
2 − ?C
3 − 2?C
, 1 =
?C
(1 + 2?C)
,
0′ =
(2:C (1 − ?C) + ?C)
(2:C (1 − ?) + 1)
, 1′ =
:C ?C
(:C + 2?C)
As the public belief is a martingale then in expectation it does not move. This
means, that the expected gain is equal to the distance between two chords that
connect D(0), D(1) and D(0′), D(1′) at point ?C . This is depicted in Figure B.1. In
other words, the expected gain is equal to the distance between 3 and 3′, where 3
belongs to the chord D(0), D(1) and 3′ to the chord D(0′)D(1′) and their ?-coordinate
is ?C . So the distance between 3′ and 3 is alongside the H-coordinate.
Let us calculate this distance. Denote by H0 and H1 - H-coordinates of 0 and 1. Notice,
that the H-coordinate of 0′ and 1′ are equal to H0 + 01(0′ − 0) and H1 − 11(1′ − 1)
where 01, 11 are some constants that are in [D′(0), D′(0′)] and [−D′(1′),−D′(1)].
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Where 3 and 3′ are the H-coordinates of point ?C on the cords D (0)D (1) and D (0′)D (1′) correspondingly.
Figure B.1: The expected gain induced by the cost.
3 = H1 +
H0 − H1
0 − 1 (?C − 1)
3′ = H1 − 11(1′ − 1) +
H0 − H1 + 01(0′ − 0) + 11(1′ − 1)
0′ − 1′ (? − 1
′).
Pluging in the expressions for 0, 1, 0′, 1′ gives us the following formula
expected gain(?C , :C) = 3′ − 3 =
((201(−1 + :C) (−1 + ?C)2?2C )
((3 − 2?C) (:C + ?C − :C ?C)2))
−
−
(211(−1 + :C):C (−1 + ?C)2?2C )
((1 + 2?C) (:C + ?C − :C ?C)2)
+
+
((−1 + :C) (−1 + ?C)2?2C (−1 − 3:C + 2(−1 + :C)?C) (H0 − H1))
(:C + ?C − :C ?C)2
=
=
(−1 + :C) (1 − ?C)2?2C
(:C + ?C − :C ?C)2
(
201
3 − 2?C
− 211:C
1 + 2?C
− (1 + 3:C − 2(−1 + :C)?C) (H0 − H1))
)
.
Denote by % the terms in the parenthesis
%(?C , :C) =
(
201
3 − 2?C
− 211:C
1 + 2?C
− (1 + 3:C − 2(−1 + :C)?C) (H0 − H1))
)
.
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Notice, that H0 ≥ H1 as 0 is closer to 1 than 1 is to 0 for ?C ≥ 1/2
2 − ?C
3 − 2?C
−
(
1 − ?C
1 + 2?C
)
=
2?C − 1
(3 − 2?C) (1 + 2?C)
≥ 0.
Let us now compare the expected gain and the expected loss due to the price :C .We
do this by subtracting the former one by the latter and taking the discount factor into
account
X
1 − Xexpected gain − expected loss =
(−1 + :C) (1 − ?C)2?2C
((:C + ?C − :C ?C)2
·(
X
1 − X
(
201
3 − 2?C
− 211:C
1 + 2?C
− (1 + 3:C − 2(−1 + :C)?C) (H0 − H1)
)
− (:C − 1)
)
=
=
(
X
1 − X%(?C , :C) − :C + 1
)
·
(−1 + :C) (1 − ?C)2?2C
((:C + ?C − :C ?C)2
We can see that the sign of this expression is defined by the parenthesis and :C − 1
terms.
Suppose that the expression in the parenthesis is positive for some :C > 1 (and
?C ∉ {0, 1})
X
1 − X
(
201
3 − 2?C
− 211:C
1 + 2?C
− (1 + 3:C − 2(−1 + :C)?C) (H0 − H1)
)
− (:C − 1) > 0
(B.2)
Then 3′− 3 is positive as the sign here is defined by this parenthesis and (:C − 1). If
we nowmake : less then 1, the expression above will increase and :C−1will become
negative, which will make the expected gain also negative. Therefore, if (B.2) holds
for some :C > 1 then the optimal :∗C is not less than 1.
Now let see whether there exists :C > 1 which gives higher utility than :C = 1 for
high enough ?C . As we said before, it is enough to show that (B.2) holds for some
:C > 1. The main challenge here is that we do not the utility function D and how
convex it is.
Still, we can say the following: H0 − H1 < 01(0 − 1) < 01/3 and 11 < 01. This
means that for ?C close enough to 1
%(?C , :C) >
(
201
3 − 2?C
− 201:C
1 + 2?C
− (1 + 3:C − 2(−1 + :C)?C)
01
3
)
)
.
98
For :C = 1 this function is increasing in ?C and at ?C = 1 it is 0. The expected loss is
also 0 for :C = 1. But as the bounds for H0 − H1 and 11 are not tight, % > 0 at 1. As
% and −(:C − 1) are also continuous functions of :C there exists a threshold ? such
that for any ?C > ? the expected gain is positive for some :C = 1+ Y. In other words,
there exists :C > 1 such that it is better to choose than :C = 1 for ?C high enough.
Moreover, if we use tighter constraints that we get from section 3.4 we can see that
it holds for ?C > 1/2.
Furthermore, there exists neighborhoods of 0 and ∞ such that the optimal :∗C does
not lie in them for any ?C .
Let us start with 0
%(?C , 0) =
201
3 − 2?C
− (1 + 2?C) (H0 − H1)
≥ 201
3 − 2?C
− (1 + 2?C)01
3
,
where the inequality comes from the fact that (H0 − H1) ≤ 01(0 − 1) ≤ 01/3.
Furthermore,
2
3 − 2?C
>
1 + 2?C
3
,
as (3 − 2?C) (1 + 2?C) ≤ 4. Thus, for : in some neighborhood of 0 %(?C , :) > 0 and
: − 1 < 0. Hence, there exists : > 0 such that :∗ > : .
Also, it is obvious that for high enough :C , %(?C , :C) is negative. There is another
case when 1′ jumps to the right side of 1/2 such that H′
1
becomes higher than H1.
Then we have a bit different expression for 3′
3′ = H1 + 11(1′ − (1 − 1)) +
H0 − H1 + 01(0′ − 0) − 11(1′ − (1 − 1))
0′ − 1′ (? − 1
′).
And hence,
3′ − 3 − expected loss(?C , :C) =
(−1 + ?C)2
(:C + ?C − :C ?C)2
(
201(−1 + :C)?2C
(3 − 2?C)
+
+
11:C (−2?C (1 + ?C) + :C (−1 + 2?2C ))
1 + 2?C
+ (−1 + :C)?2C (−1 − 3:C + 2(−1 + :C)?C)×
× (H0 − H1)) − (:C − 1)2?2C
)
.
Define the term in the big parenthesis by %′(?C , :C) and notice that
%′(?C , :C) ≤
(
201(:C − 1)?2C +
11:C · :C (2?2C − 1)
2
− (:C − 1)2?2C
)
.
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If we look at this as a function of :C then it is a downward looking parabola, which
implies that for :C high enough %′ is negative and, as a consequence, the expected
gain is smaller than the expected loss. Thus, :C does not go to∞ as ?C increases.
Therefore there exist : > 1 such that :∗ < : . This concludes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 20. This is an implication of two facts. The first one is that prices
are bounded, so it is impossible to stop aggregating information. And second, public
belief is a martingale and hence, converges. For more details see (L. Smith and
Sørensen, 2000).
Proof of Corollary 21. Suppose at time C the likelihood ratio is ;C and \ = 86ℎ.
Let us calculate ;C+1 when agent C buys the new product with price :
;C+1 = ;C ·
1 − 
(
:
;C
)
1 − !
(
:
;C
) = ;C (2 :
;C
+ 1)
)
= 2: + ;C .
This means that when everybody start taking the same correct action instead of
adding 2 to the !' we going to add 2: . Therefore, the convergence speed increases
in : times.
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A p p e n d i x C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
C.1 Agents’ objective and its approximation
Before we prove Proposition 22 we need a few auxiliary results. As we said
above, when the number of villages increases, the probability that there are multiple
connections between 8 and some other person 9 of length at most 2, that include at
least one weak link, vanishes. Furthermore, conditioning on the complement of this
event does not change our expected utility at the limit as we show in the following
proposition.
Proposition 42. For a fixed  denote by 2 an event that there are multiple pathes,
that include weak tie(s), between agent 8 and some other player of length 1 or 2 or
there is a weak-weak connection that ends in villageV8 in the realized graph (+, ).
Then
lim
#→∞
P(2) = 0
lim
#→∞
*# (?8, @8, ?, @) | −*# (?8, @8, ?, @) = 0
Proof of Proposition 42. Before we get to the event , let us consider an auxiliary
event 0 that player 8 has no more than (F40: acquaintances. We know that the
expected number of strong and weak connections are bounded by  and /2F40:
respectively because of the budget constraint. Let us prove that the probability that
there aremore than (F40: = #
1
6 weak connections goes to 0 as# increases. For agent
8 there are # potential acquaintances and each link realizes independently with
probability @8@. It means that a random variable / that equals the number of realized
weak connections is distributed binomially with parameters (# , @8@). There is the
following well-known bound for the upper tail of the binomial distribution:
P(/ ≥ A) ≤ 4G?
(
−# 
( A
# 
 @8@)) ,
where  (0
?) = 0 log 0
?
+ (1− 0) log 1−01−? is a relative entropy between Binomial(0)
and Binomial(?) and # @8@ ≤ A ≤ # . Notice, that @8@ ≤ /(# 2F40: ). Hence,
101
P(/ ≥ # 16 ) ≤ 4G? ©­«−# ©­« #
1
6
# 
log ©­«
#
1
6
# 
@8@
ª®¬ +
(
1 − #
1
6
# 
)
log
(
1 − #
1
6
# 
)ª®¬ª®¬
≤ 4G? ©­«− ©­«# 16 log ©­«
#
1
6
# 
@8@
ª®¬ +
(
# − # 16
) (
− #
1
6
# 
+$
(
1
#
5
3
))ª®¬ª®¬
≤ 4G?
(
−
(
#
1
6 log
(
#
1
6

2F40:
)
+ # 
(
− #
1
6
# 
+$
(
1
#
5
3
))))
≤ 4G?
(
−# 16
)
.
In the first inequalitywe used the fact that log(1−0)/(1−?) is negative, so decreasing
? to 0 only increases the right-hand side. In the second line we used Taylor series for
log(1 − G) for small G. To get the third inequality recall that @8@ ≤ /(# 2F40: ).
Thus,
P(/ < # 16 ) ≥ 1 − 4G?−#
1
6
,
which converges to 1 as # increases. Let us condition on the event, 0, that there
are at most (F40: = #
1
6 ties. Then the number of weak, weak-strong, strong-weak
and weak-weak ties is bounded by (F40: + 2(F40: + (2F40: < 3#
1
3 . Denote this
bound by (̄. We are now going to show that the probability that these pathes do not
overlap with each other goes to 1 as we increase the number of villages # .
For each path we are going to pick 1 out of # villages where it ends1. Note that if
all these (̄ villages that we chose are distinct then none of the pathes can overlap
with each other. Denote by - a number of times that we pick some village that was
already chosen before. Let us calculate the expected value of this random variable.
We are going to choose villages sequentially with replacement. For the =-th pick
denote by 1= an indicator function which equals to 1 if the =-th village we choose
has already been chosen before. Then the expectation of - equals to the expected
sum of these indicator functions from 1 to (̄.
The first path can not be assigned to the village that was already chosen, as it is the
first one. The second one will have the same village as the first path with probability
1/# . For the third one, the probability is less than 2/# . Let us eleborate this
part. The first two pathes can be either in the same or in different villages with some
probabilities, ?1 and 1− ?1. Then, the probability the third one is in the same village
1For each weak-weak path we choose two villages: one for the first weak link and one for the
second one.
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as one of the first two is ?11/# + (1 − ?1)2/# < 2/# . The analogous argument is
applied to the subsequent ones as well. Therefore,
E(-) ≤ 0 + 1
#
+ 2
#
+ · · · + (̄ − 1
#
=
(̄((̄ − 1)
2#
Hence,
((( − 1)
2#
≥ E(-) =
:∑
8=1
P(- = 8)8 ≥
:∑
8=1
P(- = 8) = 1 − P(- = 0)
Thus,
P(- = 0) ≥ 1 − (̄((̄ − 1)
2#
> 1 − 4#
2
3
2#
= 1 − 2
#
1
3
which goes to 1 as # increases. Let us call the event when - = 0, 1 and its
complement 21.
Now we will calculate the probability of the event that there is at least one weak-
weak path that comes back to villageV8. Denote by =V8F the number of weak-weak
pathes that end up in V8 and by 2 an event that =V8F = 0. This means that none of
the acquaintance of 8 has an acquaintance in 8’s village. If everyone has at most (̄
acquaintances and each of them has at most (̄ weak links then the probability of 22,
that at least one weak-weak path comes back toV8, is equal to
P(=V8F > 0) = 1 − P(=V8F = 0) = 1 −
(
1 − 1
#
) (̄2
,
which converges to 0 as # → ∞. Then the probability of either events 21 or 
2
2
happening is less than or equal to the sum of their corresponding probabilities.
P(21 ∪ 
2
2) ≤ P(
2
1) + (
2
2) ≤ 1 −
(
1 − 1
#
) (̄2
+ (̄((̄ − 1)
2#
,
which goes to 0 as # goes to∞. Therefore, P(1 ∩ 2) converges to 1.
Notice, that we calculated probabilities of 1 ∩ 2 conditioned on 0. But because
all their corresponding probabilities converge to 1 the limit of the probability of the
unconditional event 1 ∩ 2 is also 1.
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lim
#→∞
P(1 ∩ 2) = lim
#→∞
(
P(1 ∩ 2 |0)P(0) + P(1 ∩ 2 |20)P(
2
0)
)
= 1.
Now we will calculate the absolute difference in expected utility, *# , when we
condition on  = 1 ∩ 2 and when we do not.
|E(* |) − E(*) | =
 E(*1)1 − P(2) − E(*)
=
E(*)P(2) − E(*12 )1 − P(2) 
≤4| |* | |∞P(2),
as the denominator is bigger than 1/2 and the numerator is less than 2| |* | |∞P(2).
The right-hand side converges to 0, because* is bounded and P(2) goes to 0 as #
increases. Therefore, we can use our approximation of the utility function.
Now, if we calculate*# | we will almost have*∞. Recall, that when we condition
on the event , there are only 5 groups of people that affect 8’s utility: # B1 (8), #
F
1 (8),
# BB1 (8), #
FB
2 (8), #
FF
2 . The following proposition calculates the expected number of
people in these different types of neighborhoods and*# | itself.
Proposition 43.
* (?8, @8, ?, @) | =
(
1 + ( − 1)?8? +  #@8@ + ( − 1) (1 − ?8?)×
× (1 − (1 − ?8?3) −2)+
+ 
(
?8?@
2 ( − 1)# + ?2@8@ ( − 1)#
)
+
+ 2@8@3 2# (# − 1)
)
Proof of Proposition 43. Before we calculate the expected number of people in
different groups we need some notation. Denote by
• # B1 (8) – a set of strong connections of 8;
• #F1 (8) – a set of weak connections of 8;
• # BB2 (8) – a set of strong-strong connections of 8, that are not in #
B
1 (8);
• #FB2 (8) – a set of weak-strong or strong-weak connections of 8;
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• #FF2 (8) – a set of weak-weak connections of 8.
Let us proceed. Expectation is a linear operator, hence we can calculate the expected
number of people for each of those five groups seperately. Let us start with # B
8
(8).
There are  − 1 people in the village besides player 8 and she is going to connect
to each of them with probability ?8?. Therefore, E(+,) |# B8 (8) | = ( − 1)?8?.
Analogously, E(+,) |#F8 (8) | =  #@8@.
In order for an agent to be in # BB2 (8) she can not be connected directly to 8 but
there has to be exactly one person between them. The probability that player 9 is not
connected to 8 through person : (8, 9 , : are in the same villageV8) is (1− ?8?: ?: ? 9 ).
As all edges appear (or not) independently of each other, the probability that 8 is
connected to 9 at distance 2 is
1 −
∏
:∈V8
:≠8, 9
(1 − ?8?: ?: ? 9 ).
The subtrahend is the probability that 8 is not connected to 9 through any player :
in the same village. After we apply symmetry (every player, except 8, plays strategy
(?, @)) and remember that 9 can not be at distance 1 from 8, i.e. there can not be a
strong edge between 8 and 9 , we get the desired formula:
E{?C ,@C } |# BB2 (8) | = ( − 1) (1 − ?8?) (1 − (1 − ?8?
3) −2)
Now let us calculate the expected number of strong-weak connections. For each
individual 9 who is a firend of player 8, 8, 9 ∈ V8, we need to calculate how many
acquaintances 9 has, =F
9
, and add them up.
E
©­«
∑
9∈V8
148 9∈B =
F
9
ª®¬ =
∑
9∈V8
E
(
148 9∈B =
F
9
)
=
∑
9∈+8
E
(
148 9∈B
)
E =F9 =
= ?8?( − 1)@2 #.
In the equations above we used linearity of expectation and the fact that 148 9∈B
and =F
9
are independent, hence, expectation of their product is the product of their
expectations.
For the weak-strong and weak-weak connections we can do the analogous calcula-
tions. Denote by =B
:
the number of strong friends that player : ,: ∉ V8, has.
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#FB2 (8) = E
(∑
:∉V8
148:∈F =
B
:
)
=
∑
:∉V8
E
(
148:∈F =
B
:
)
=
∑
:∉V8
E
(
148:∈F
)
E =B: =
=  #@8@( − 1)?2,
where =B
:
and 148:∈F are independent.
For the weak-weak links denote by =F
:
the number of acquaintances player : ∉ V8
has.
#FF2 (8) = E
(∑
:∉V8
148:∈F =
F
:
)
=
∑
:∉V8
E
(
148:∈F
)
E =F: = # @8@(# − 1) @
2.
In the last equation we have # (# − 1) instead of #2 because in the event  weak-
weak links do not come back to the same village that player 8 is. This means that
8’s acquaintances can only pick from # − 1 other villages to create weak-weak
connections.
Recall that because we are conditioning on event  then none of these pathes, that we
calculated above, overlap with each other. Now we just subsitute these calculations
into the objective function to complete the proof.
Now we are ready to prove Proposition 22.
Proof of Proposition 22. From Proposition 42 we know that *# uniformly con-
verges to * |. Define ! to be "F40: ( − 1)/. Then we have @8@ = ! ("BCA>=6 −
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?8?). Notice that
* | =
(
1 + ( − 1)?8? + cF #! ("BCA>=6 − ?8?) + ( − 1) (1 − ?8?)×
× (1 − (1 − ?8?3) −2)+
+ cF
(
?8?! ("BCA>=6 − ?2) ( − 1)# + ?2! ("BCA>=6 − ?8?) ( − 1)#
)
+
+ c2F! ("BCA>=6 − ?8?)! ("BCA>=6 − ?2) 2# (# − 1)
)
= 1 + ( − 1)?8? +
cF
2F40:
( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − ?8?) + ( − 1) (1 − ?8?)×
× (1 − (1 − ?8?3) −2)+
+ cF
2F40:
( − 1)2
(
?8?("BCA>=6 − ?2)+
+ ?2("BCA>=6 − ?8?)
)
+
c2F (# − 1)
22
F40:
#
("BCA>=6 − ?8?)×
× ("BCA>=6 − ?2) ( − 1)2
=*∞ −
c2F
22
F40:
1
#
("BCA>=6 − ?8?) ("BCA>=6 − ?2) ( − 1)2
=*∞ +$
(
1
#
)
,
where in the first equation we used notation from (4.1).
This means that * | uniformly converges to *∞. Therefore, *# also uniformly
converges to*∞.
Let us show that equilibrium of *# , ?# , can only be within Y-neighborhood of the
equilibrium of *∞. First, notice that *# and *∞ both have two trivial equilibria:
1) all players invest only in friends and 2) all players invest only in acquaintances.
Now let us deal with the non trivial one. For each ?, *∞(?8, @8 (?8), ?, @(?)) has
a unique maximum with respect to ?8, as it is a concave function. Denote by
5 (?) the value of ?8 at which the corresponding maximum is attained. This is a
continuous function as *∞ is a polynomial of a fixed degree of ?8 and ?, hence, a
small change in ? will require a small change in ?8 to maintain m*∞/m?8 = 0. Then
ℎ(?) = *∞(?, @(?), ?, @(?)) − *∞( 5 (?), @( 5 (?)), ?, @(?)) is also a continuous
function due to a triangle inequality. Therefore, ℎ attains its minimum, X, on
[Y, ?∗ − Y] ∪ [?∗ + Y,
√
"BCA>=6 − Y] which is positive. Hence, for #̄ big enough
such that *∞ − *# < X/3 for # > #̄ there are no equilibria of the initial utility
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function ouside of those neighborhoods of the equilibria of*∞. This concludes one
direction.
Now let us show the other direction. There are three equilibria of *∞: two trivial
and one non trivial. Also, *# has the same two trivial equilibria. Let us prove
that there is a non trivial equilibrium of *# in some negihborhood of ?∗. Let
?1 = ?∗ − Y and ?2 = ?∗ + Y. For both ?1 and ?2 let us find #1 and #2 such that the
maximums of*∞(?8, @8 (?8), ?1, @(?1)) and*∞(?8, @8 (?8), ?2, @(?2)) with respect
to ?8 are within the X-neighborhood of the maximums of *# (?8, @8 (?8), ?1, @(?1))
and*# (?8, @8 (?8), ?2, @(?2)) correspondingly. Notice, that*# (?8, @8 (?), ?, @(?))
can not havemaximums outside of these neighborhoods as*∞(?8, @8 (?), ?, @(?)) is
single-peaked for a fixed ?with respect to ?8. Pick X to be equal tomin(ℎ(?1), ℎ(?2)).
We can do this because*# uniformly converges*∞. Let us pick #0 = max(#1, #2).
Then we know that at ? = ?1 the maximum of *# (?8, @8 (?8), ?1, @(?1)) is to the
right of ?8 = ?12 and at ? = ?2 the maximum of*# (?8, @8 (?8), ?2, @(?2)) is to the
left of ?8 = ?2 for all # > #0. Hence, at some point ?1 ≤ ?# ≤ ?2 the maximum of
*# (?8, @8 (?8), ?, @(?)) crosses the line of ?8 = ?. This is a symmetric non trivial
equilibrium of*# in ?∗’s the neighborhood.
Therefore, there are equilibria of *# within the Y-neighborhood of (trivial and non
trivial) equilibria of *∞. Moreover, there are no equilibria of the initial utility
function outside of those neighborhoods.
C.2 Equilibrium and comparative statics
Proof of Theorem 23. In order to prove this theoremweneed to show that (m*∞/m?8)

?8=?
=
0 has a unique non trivial solution.
2m*∞/m?8

?8=?
is positive at ? = ?1 and negative at ? = ?2.
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m*∞
m?8

?8=?
=?cF
2 2#2!2
(
?2 − ("BCA>=6 − ?2)
)
+
+ ?cF ( − 1) #!
(
("BCA>=6 − ?2) − ?2
)
−
− cF ( − 1) #?3! − ?cF #! + ?( − 1)
(
1 − ?4
) −2
+
+ ( − 2) ( − 1)?3
(
1 − ?2
) (
1 − ?4
) −3
=( − 2) ( − 1)?3
(
1 − ?2
) (
1 − ?4
) −3
+ ?( − 1)
(
1 − ?4
) −2
+
− cF #!?
(
1 − ( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − 2?2) + cF #! ("BCA>=6 − ?2)
)
=( − 2) ( − 1)?3
(
1 − ?2
) (
1 − ?4
) −3
+ ?( − 1)
(
1 − ?4
) −2
+
− cF
2F40:
( − 1)?
(
1 − ( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − 2?2)+
+ cF
2F40:
( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − ?2)
)
.
Notice, that we can do this if @8@ > 0, otherwise, all terms that include a weak tie
become 0 and we do not differentiate them. When @8@ = 0,*∞ it is a trivial equilib-
rium of*∞, as well as of*# , to choose ?8 =
√
"BCA>=6 ∀ 8. Denote (m*∞/m?8)

?8=?
by .
 =( − 2) ( − 1)?3
(
1 − ?2
) (
1 − ?4
) −3
+ ?( − 1)
(
1 − ?4
) −2
+
− cF
2F40:
( − 1)?
(
1 − ( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − 2?2) +
cF
2F40:
( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − ?2)
)
=)1(?) + )2(?).
where )1 is the term on the 1st line and )2 – on the 2nd one. We will prove that 
has a unique non trivial root.
Under the assumptions of the theorem,  has the following form: it is 0 at ? = 0,
has a positive derivative there (when 2F40: > cF), it is negative at
√
"BCA>=6 (when
4
−2
 −1 (1 − "BCA>=6) < cF/2F40: ) and crosses 0 only once on (0,
√
"BCA>=6). Let us
show this. It is clear that  (0) = 0, so we will skip it.
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′(0) = ( − 1)
(
cF
(
cF ( − 1)
(
3?2 − "BCA>=6
)
22
F40:
+
+
−2F40:
(
6( − 1)?2 −  "BCA>=6 + "BCA>=6
) )
22
F40:
+ 1
22
F40:
−
(
1 − ?2
) −3 (
?2 + 1
) −4 (
( − 1) (4 − 7)?6 + (6 − 11)?4+
+ (5 − 3 )?2 − 1
))
?=0
= ( − 1)
(
cF
(
( − 1)"BCA>=6 (2F40: − cF) − 2F40:
)
22
F40:
+ 1
)
= ( − 1)
©­­«
cF
(
( − 1)" (2F40: − cF) + 2F40:
(
2F40:
cF
− 1
))
22
F40:
ª®®¬
= ( − 1)
©­­«
cF
(
(2F40: − cF)
(
( − 1)"BCA>=6 + 2F40:cF
))
22
F40:
ª®®¬
> 0,
as 2F40: > cF.
This implies that within some Y-neighborhood of ? = 0,  is positive. Now we are
going to show that at the other end, at ? =
√
"BCA>=6, it is negative.
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 (
√
"BCA>=6) = ( − 1)
(
"
1
2
BCA>=6 (1 − "BCA>=6) −2("BCA>=6 + 1) −3×
× (( − 1)"BCA>=6 + 1) −
cF"
1
2
BCA>=6
2F40:
(1 + ( − 1)"BCA>=6)
)
= − ( − 1) (1 + ( − 1)"BCA>=6)"
1
2
BCA>=6
(
cF
2F40:
− (1 − "2BCA>=6) −3×
× (1 − "BCA>=6)
)
= − ( − 1) (1 + ( − 1)"BCA>=6)"
1
2
BCA>=6
(
cF
2F40:
−
−
(
1 − 
2
( − 1)2
) −3 (
1 − 
 − 1
) )
≤ − ( − 1) (1 + ( − 1)"BCA>=6)"
1
2
BCA>=6
(
cF
2F40:
− 4−
2 ( −3)
( −1)2 ×
×
(
1 − 
 − 1
) )
< 0,
as cF
2F40:
> 4
− 
2 ( −3)
( −1)2
(
1 − 
 −1
)
.
The fact that  (
√
"BCA>=6) < 0,  (Y) > 0 for some small Y > 0 and it is a continuous
function implies that ∃ ?∗ ∈ (0,
√
"BCA>=6) such that  (?∗) = 0. Now we just need
to make sure that such non trivial equilibrium ?∗ is unique.
Because our function is positive and increasing near the 0 and is negative near√
"BCA>=6 then, at some point, ?★, its derivative has to become negative, ′(?★) < 0,
before  (?) becomes negative.
′(?) =( − 1) (1 − ?4) −4(1 − ?2)
(
1 + (3 − 5)?2 − (6 − 11)?4 − ( − 1)×
× (4 − 7)?6 −
3( − 1)?2
(
2 − cF
2F40:
)
cF
2F40:
(1 − ?4) −4(1 − ?2)
)
+
+ ( − 1) cF
2F40:
(
"BCA>=6 ( − 1)
(
1 − cF
2F40:
)
− 1
)
We would like ′(?) to stay negative after the first time it becomes less than 0.
Then it can not cross 0 more than once. Assume that the constant term above is
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positive3. It is a part of the derivative of the second summand of  (?), )2(?).
Notice, that )2(?) has to be negative at the non trivial equilibrium, because )1(?) is
always positive and their sum is 0. Also, )2(?) is concave, )2(0) = 0 and ) ′2(0) ≥ 0,
therefore, before )2 becomes negative, its derivative has to become less than 0.
Denote by ?1 a point at which ) ′2(?1) = 0. Then we can rewrite 
′(?) as
′(?) = ( − 1) (1 − ?4) −4(1 − ?2)(?),
where
(?) = 0?2 − 2?2 − 1?4 − 2?6 −
03 (?2 − ?21)(
1 − ?2
) (
1 − ?4
) −4 + 1,
and 0 = 3( −1), 1 = (6 −11), 2 = ( −1) (4 −7), 3 = (2−cF/2F40: )cF/2F40: .
It will be sufficient to show that once  becomes negative it stays negative as
(1− ?4) −4(1− ?2) is always positive for ? ∈ [0,
√
"BCA>=6]. Notice that (0) > 0,
so before it gets negative its derivative has to become negative.
′(?) =2?
(
− 03
(
?2 + 1
)3− (
1 − ?2
)2− (
2( − 4)?4 + ?2
(
(−2 + 7)?12 + 1
)
−
− ?12 + 1
)
+ 0 − 21?2 − 32?4 − 2
)
Now, call the term in parentheses (?), then ′ is negative for ? > 0.
′(?) = − 4?
(
1 − ?4
)− ( (
1 − ?4
) (
1 + 32?2
)
+ 03
(
?2 − 1
) (
?2 + 1
)2
×
×
(
− ( − 4) (2 − 7)?6 + (2 − 7)?4
(
( − 3)?12 − 1
)
+
+ ?2
(
2( − 3)?12 − 3 + 10
)
+ ( − 3)?12 − 1
))
= − 4?
(
1 − ?4
)− ( (
1 − ?4
) (
1 + 32?2
)
+ 03
(
?2 − 1
) (
?2 + 1
)2
×
×
(
− 1 − (2 − 7)?4
(
( − 4)?2 + 1 − ( − 3)?12
)
−
− ?2
(
− 2( − 3)?12 + 2 + 7
)
− ( − 3) (?2 − ?12)
))
<0.
3If it is negative then instead of having ?2 − ?21 below we are going to have ?
2 + ?21 which will
only help with the analogous proof.
112
Thus, ′(?) is negative. This implies the following. When ′ becomes negative it
stays negative. As (0) > 0, before  becomes negative its derivative, ′, has to
become negative. Therefore, once  starts decreasing it continues decreasing from
that point on. So when  becomes negative it stays negative and this is what we
wanted. Hence,  (?) crosses 0 only once on (0,
√
"BCA>=6). Let us call this point
?∗. This is a unique non trivial equilibrium of*∞.
Now, assume that cF ≥ 2F40: then cF/2F40: ≥ 1 > (1−"2BCA>=6) −3(1−"BCA>=6).
Furthermore, it means that  (0) = 0 and ′ is negative on (0,
√
"BCA>=6). Thus,
there is only one equilibrium of *∞: ∀ 8 ?8 = 0 and @8 = "F40: . When cF > 2F40:
weak links are more beneficial at both distance 1 and 2 and so no one wants to invest
in friends.
On the other hand, if cF/2F40: < (1 − "2BCA>=6) −3(1 − "BCA>=6) then cF < 2F40: .
It means that  (
√
"BCA>=6) > 0. Hence,  (?) = 0 does not have a solution and is
positive on (0,
√
"BCA>=6]. So without the two conditions of the theorem we have
only trivial symmetric equilibria.
To finish the proof we will show that we found the maximum and not the minimum.
m2*∞
m?2
8

?8=?
= − ( − 2) ( − 1)?4
(
1 − ?2
) −3 (
?2 + 1
) −4 (
( − 1)?2 + 2
)
<0.
Thus, the extremum we found is indeed the maximum. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 24. To prove this proposition, let us calculate derivatives of
 (?) with respect to 2F40: , cF and  . We know from Theorem 23 the derivative
of  at ?∗ is negative. Hence, if we know the derivatives of  and their signs
with respect to those parameters we will be able to calculate the corresponding
comparative statics. Notice, that only the second summand of  depends on these
3 parameters, which simplifies calculations.
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1) m (?
∗)
m2F40:
= m
(
− cF ( − 1)
2F40:
?∗
(
1 − ( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − 2?∗
2)
)
+
+ cF
2F40:
( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − ?∗
2)
)
/m2F40:
=
cF?
∗2F40:
(
1 − ( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − 2?∗
2)
)
23
F40:
+
+ cF?∗
2cF ( − 1)
(
"BCA>=6 − ?∗
2
)
23
F40:
·
Remember, that the second summand of  is negative at the equilibrium, )2(?∗) < 0
from Theorem 23, therefore
m (?∗)
m2F40:
=
−)2(?∗) +
c2F ?
∗ ( −1) ("BCA>=6−?∗
2 )
22
F40:
2F40:
> 0.
Therefore, as we increase 2F40: , ?∗ also increases.
2) m (?
∗)
m
= −
?∗
(
1 − ( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − 2?∗
2) + 2 cF
2F40:
( − 1)
(
"BCA>=6 − ?∗
2
))
2F40:
< 0.
We get the last inequality in the same way we argued in 1) that )2(?∗)/cF minus
something negative is negative at ?∗.
3) m
′(?)
m 
= ?
( (
1 − ?2
) (
1 − ?4
) −3 ((
( − 1)?2 + 1
)
log
(
1 − ?4
)
+ ?2
)
−
− ?2
(
2 − cF
2F40:
)
cF
2F40:
)
Notice, that log (1 − ?4) < 0. Furthermore, at the approximate equilibrium ?∗ we
have
 (?∗) = 0
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0 =( − 1)?∗
(
1 − ?∗2
) −2 (
?∗
2 + 1
) −3 (
( − 1)?∗2 + 1
)
−
− cF ( − 1)
2F40:
?∗
(
1 − ( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − 2?∗
2) + cF
2F40:
( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − ?∗
2)
)
.
Hence,
(
1 − ?∗2
) (
1 − ?∗4
) −3
=
cF
(
1 − ( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − 2?∗
2)
)
2F40:
(
( − 1)?∗2 + 1
) +
+
c2F
2F40:
( − 1) (" − ?∗2)
2F40:
(
( − 1)?∗2 + 1
)
Let us substitute this into m′(?)/m , but skip the term with the logarithm and the
? term outside the parentheses.
cF
(
1 − ( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − 2?∗
2) + cF
2F40:
( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − ?∗
2)
)
2F40:
(
( − 1)?∗2 + 1
) ?∗2−
− ?∗2
(
2 − cF
2F40:
)
cF
2F40:
=
cF?
∗2
2F40: (( − 1)?∗2 + 1)
(
1 − ( − 1)"BCA>=6
(
1 − cF
2F40:
)
+ ?∗2 ( − 1)
(
2 − cF
2F40:
)
−
−
(
2 − cF
2F40:
)
(( − 1)?∗2 + 1)
)
=
cF?
2
2F40: (( − 1)?2 + 1)
(
− 1 + cF
2F40:
− ( − 1)"BCA>=6
(
1 − cF
2F40:
) )
< 0.
Thus, the whole m′(?)/m is also negative at ? = ?∗. So the probability of having
a strong friend is decreasing as we increase  . This concludes our proof.
Proof of Lemma 25. First we are going to show that ?∗2 > @∗2 in equilibrium.
Remember that from the proof of Theorem 23
?∗
2
> "
2F40: − cF
22F40: − cF
− 2F40:( − 1) (22F40: − cF)
=
( − 1)2F40: − cF
( − 1) (22F40: − cF)
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as the )2(?) term has to be negative. Hence,
@∗
2
= ! (" − ?∗2) < ( − 1)
 #2F40:
(
(22F40: − cF) − ( − 1)2F40: + cF
( − 1) (22F40: − cF)
−
)
=
( + 1)
 # (22F40: − cF)
·
Let us look at their difference
?∗
2 − @∗2 > ( − 1)2F40: − cF( − 1) (22F40: − cF)
− ( + 1)
 # (22F40: − cF)
=
( − 1)2F40: # − cF # − ( + 1) ( − 1)
( − 1) # (22F40: − cF)
·
For this difference to be greater than 0 we need to have
2F40: >

( − 1) cF +
( + 1) ( − 1)
( − 1) # ·
Now let us remember a well-known fact about Erdős - Rényi random graphs: the
golbal clustering coefficient for friends’ network is equal to ?∗2 +$
(
( #)−0.5
)
and
the global  for acquanintances’ network is @∗2 + $
(
( #)−0.5
)
. Using this fact
and the inequality that we got above we can conclude that when 2F40: is not too
close to cF or when # is big enough (so ?∗ > 0 and @∗ < ?∗ for big enough #)
the  of the friends’ network is bigger than the  of the acquaintances’. This
concludes the proof.
C.3 Socially optimal network
Proof of Theorem 26. To prove this theorem we are going to differentiate
*∞(?, @(?), ?, @(?)) ≡ *>?C8<0; (?) and find its non-trivial root ?>?C8<0; , which is
also unique. Then we will show that ?>?C8<0; has to be bigger than ?∗.
*′>?C8<0; (?) = 2?( − 1)
(
2( − 2)?2
(
1 − ?2
) −2 (
?2 + 1
) −3
+
(
1 − ?4
) −2
−
− cF
2F40:
(
1 − 2( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − 2?2)
)
+
+ 2cF
2F40:
( − 1)
(
"BCA>=6 − ?2
) )
.
As we can see it greatly resembles
(
m*∞/m?8
)
?8=?
. Before we proceed, let us
show that *′
>?C8<0;
has the same shape as
(
m*∞/m?8
)
?8=?
: at 0 it equals 0 and
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has a positive derivative. Moreover, once its derivative becomes negative it stays
negative.
*′>?C8<0; (0) =0
*′′>?C8<0; (0) =
(
cF
(
2( − 1)"BCA>=6
(
1 − cF
2F40:
)
− 6( − 1)?2
(
2 − cF
2F40:
)
− 1
)
2F40:
−
−
(
1 − ?2
) −3 (
?2 + 1
) −4 (
(2 − 3) (4 − 7)?6 + (8 − 15)?4+
+ (11 − 6 )?2 − 1
))
?=0
=
cF
(
2( − 1)"BCA>=6
(
1 − cF
2F40:
)
− 1
)
2F40:
+ 1
>0,
as 2F40: > cF.
*′>?C8<0; (
√
"BCA>=6) = 2
√
"BCA>=6 ( − 1)
( (
1 − ?2
) −2 (
?2 + 1
) −3
×
×
(
(2 − 3)?2 + 1
)
−
− cF
2F40:
(
1 − 2( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − 2"BCA>=6)
)
+
+ 2cF
2F40:
( − 1)
(
"BCA>=6 − "BCA>=6
))
= −
(
cF
2F40:
− (1 − "BCA>=6)−2+ (1 + "BCA>=6)−3+ 
)
×
× (1 + (−2 + 2 )"BCA>=6) − (1 − "BCA>=6)−2+ ×
× (1 + "BCA>=6)−3+ "BCA>=6
< 0.
We got the last inequality from the same condition we had in Theorem 23, which is
necessary for an existance of the equilibrum, ?∗.
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*′′>?C8<0; (?) = 2( − 1)
( (
1 − ?2
) −3 (
?2 + 1
) −4 (
− (2 − 3) (4 − 7)?6−
− (8 − 15)?4 + (6 − 11)?2 + 1
)
+
+ cF
2F40:
(
2
(
( − 1)"BCA>=6
(
1 − cF
2F40:
)
− 3( − 1)?2
(
2 − cF
2F40:
))
−
− 1
))
As we can see*′′
>?C8<0;
is positive at ? = Y for Y small enough, so its derivative has
to become negative before *′
>?C8<0;
becomes negative. To prove that once *′
>?C8<0;
becomes negative it stays negative we can do an analogous exercise to the one we
did in Theorem 23.
Now let see if the solution to m*>?C8<0;/m? = 0, ?>?C8<0; , is bigger than ?∗, the non
trivial solution to
(
m*∞/m?8
)
?8=?
= 0. To do this we are going to look at the sign
of*′
>?C8<0;
(?∗).
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*′>?C8<0; (?
∗) =2?∗( − 1)
(
2( − 2)?∗2
(
1 − ?∗2
) −2 (
?∗
2 + 1
) −3
+
(
1 − ?∗4
) −2
−
− cF
2F40:
(
1 − 2( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − 2?∗
2) + 2 cF
2F40:
( − 1)×
× ("BCA>=6 − ?∗
2)
))
=?∗( − 1)
(
4( − 2)?∗2
(
1 − ?∗2
) −2 (
?∗
2 + 1
) −3
+ 2
(
1 − ?∗4
) −2
−
− cF
2F40:
(
2 − 4( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − 2?∗
2) + 4 cF
2F40:
( − 1)×
× ("BCA>=6 − ?∗
2)
))
=?∗( − 1)
(
2( − 2)?∗2
(
1 − ?∗2
) −2 (
?∗
2 + 1
) −3
−
− cF
2F40:
(
− 2( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − 2?∗
2) + 2 cF
2F40:
( − 1)×
× ("BCA>=6 − ?∗
2)
))
=2?∗( − 1)
(
( − 2)?∗2
(
1 − ?∗2
) −2 (
?∗
2 + 1
) −3
+
− cF
2F40:
(
− ( − 1) ("BCA>=6 − 2?∗
2) + cF
2F40:
( − 1)×
× ("BCA>=6 − ?∗
2)
))
,
where in the third equation we used the fact that
(
m*∞/m?8
)
?8=?
(?∗) = 0. We are
going to use it one more time now to get
*>?C8<0; (?∗) =2?∗( − 1)
(
−
(
1 − ?∗4
) −2
+ cF
2F40:
)
Therefore, if
cF
2F40:
>
(
1 − ?∗4
) −2
then*′
>?C8<0;
(?∗) > 0, hence, ?>?C8<0; > ?∗.
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To conclude the proof, let us show that ?>?C8<0; is indeed amaximumnot aminimum.
Notice, that *>?C8<0; (?) is a polynomial of one variable that has one extreme point
on (0,
√
"BCA>=6]. As we showed before,*′>?C8<0; is non negative in Y−neighborhood
of 0 and positive outside of ? = 0. Furthermore, *′
>?C8<0;
(
√
"BCA>=6) < 0. This
means that the maximum of our function is not attained at the endpoints. Thus, the
extreme point that we found is the maximum. This concludes our proof.
